{"database": "press", "table": "releases", "rows": [["https://ansari.house.gov/media/press-releases/ansari-urging-court-uphold-protected-status-for-venezuela", "Ansari Joins Over 120 Members in Filing Amicus Brief Urging Court to Uphold Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela", "2025-11-13", "2025", "2025-11", "Democrat", "House", "AZ", "Yassamin Ansari", "A000381", "ansari.house.gov", "ansari", "https://ansari.house.gov/media/press-releases", "scraper", "WASHINGTON - Representative Yassamin Ansari (AZ-03) joined over 120 members of Congress in submitting an amicus brief to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of National TPS Alliance et al. v. Noem, urging the reversal of the Trump Administration\u2019s baseless decision to vacate and terminate the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for Venezuela. First granted for Venezuela in 2021, TPS has provided approximately 600,000 Venezuelans in the U.S. refuge from economic turmoil and humanitarian crisis in their home country, and authorization to live and work legally in America.\n\nA District Court ruled in September that the Trump Administration\u2019s decision to vacate and terminate Venezuela\u2019s TPS designation was unlawful. After the Trump Administration appealed the decision to the Supreme Court to request a stay of that ruling, Senator Van Hollen, Representative Wasserman Schultz, and their colleagues filed an amicus brief calling for the District Court decision to be upheld. The Supreme Court later sided with the Administration \u2013 allowing the Department of Homeland Security to continue stripping Venezuelans of their protections to remain lawfully in the U.S. while the case is fully considered in the Ninth Circuit.\n\nAs they argued in their amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the lawmakers again stressed to the Ninth Circuit that the District Court correctly ruled in alignment with the intent of Congress \u2013 that the Executive Branch is to determine humanitarian protections such as TPS according to set criteria as opposed to political preferences. \u201cThe Northern District of California properly determined that the plain text of the TPS statute does not support the Secretary\u2019s argument that her actions are unreviewable. Nor does it support the Secretary\u2019s actions with respect to Venezuelan TPS. Instead, the Executive Branch\u2019s interpretation of the TPS statute essentially rewrites the statute to claim a power that Congress did not delegate to the Executive Branch,\u201d they wrote in the brief\u2019s introduction.\n\nThey also pointed to Congress\u2019 tradition of bipartisan support for TPS and for protecting law-abiding individuals from being sent into harm\u2019s way, writing, \u201cthe Secretary\u2019s actions not only violate the TPS statute but also contradict the bipartisan opposition to terminating Venezuela TPS. Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle have long supported temporary protected status for Venezuelans who fled dangerous conditions in their country \u2013 conditions that persist today.\u201d\n\nJoining Senator Van Hollen and Representative Wasserman Schultz o\n\nAlso on this brief are Senators Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Chris Van Hollen (D.-Md.), Mark Warner (D-Va.), and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.); and Representatives Gabe Amo (D-R.I.), Becca Balint (D-Vt.), Nanette Diaz Barrag\u00e1n (D-Calif.), Joyce Beatty (D-Ohio), Wesley Bell (D-Mo.), Don Beyer (D-Va.), Brendan Boyle (D-Pa.), Shontel Brown (D-Ohio), Julia Brownley (D-Calif.), Janelle Bynum (D-Ore.), Andr\u00e9 Carson (D-Ind.), Troy Carter (D-La.), Greg Casar (D-Texas), Sean Casten (D-Ill.), Kathy Castor (D-Fla.), Joaquin Castro (D-Texas), Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-Fla.), Judy Chu (D-Calif.), Yvette Clarke (D-N.Y.), Emanuel Cleaver (D-Mo.), Steve Cohen (D-Tenn.), Herb Conaway (D-N.J.), Lou Correa (D-Calif.), Angie Craig (D-Minn.), Jasmine Crockett (D-Texas), Danny Davis (D-Ill.), Madeleine Dean (D-Pa.), Diana DeGette (D-Colo.), Suzan DelBene (D-Wash.), Mark DeSaulnier (D-Calif.), Maxine Dexter (D-Ore.), Lloyd Doggett (D-Texas), Sarah Elfreth (D-Md.), Veronica Escobar (D-Texas), Adriano Espaillat (D-N.Y.), Lizzie Fletcher (D-Texas), Lois Frankel (D-Fla.), Laura Friedman (D-Calif.), Maxwell Frost (D-Fla.), Robert Garcia (D-Calif.), Sylvia Garcia (D-Texas), Chuy Garcia (D-Ill.), Dan Goldman (D-N.Y.), Jimmy Gomez (D-Calif.), Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.), Jared Huffman (D-Calif.), Glenn Ivey (D-Md.), Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.), Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), Hank Johnson (D-Ga.), Sydney Kamlager-Dove (D-Calif.), Bill Keating (D-Mass.), Robin Kelly (D-Ill.), Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-Ill.), Greg Landsman (D-Ohio), John Larson (D-Conn.), Summer Lee (D-Pa.), Stephen Lynch (D-Mass.), Sarah McBride (D-Del.), Jennifer McClellan (D-Va.), Betty McCollum (D-Minn.), April McClain Delaney (D-Md.), Jim McGovern (D-Mass.), LaMonica McIver (D-N.J.), Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), Rob Menendez (D-N.J.), Grace Meng (D-N.Y.), Kweisi Mfume (D-Md.), Dave Min (D-Calif.), Kelly Morrison (D-Minn.), Jared Moskowitz (D-Fla.), Seth Moulton (D-Mass.), Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.), Richard Neal (D-Mass.), Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.), Frank Pallone (D-N.J.), Chellie Pingree (D-Maine), Stacey Plaskett (D-Virgin Islands), Nellie Pou (D-N.J.), Mike Quigley (D-Ill.), Delia Ramirez (D-Ill.), Emily Randall (D-Wash.), Jamie Raskin (D-Md.), Luz Rivas (D-Calif.), Andrea Salinas (D-Ore.), Linda Sanchez (D-Calif.), Mary Gay Scanlon (D-Pa.), Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.), Brad Schneider (D-Ill.), Terri Sewell (D-Ala.), Brad Sherman (D-Calif.), Lateefah Simon (D-Calif.), Darren Soto (D-Fla.), Melanie Stansbury (D-N.M.), Marilyn Strickland (D-Wash.), Tom Suozzi (D-N.Y.), Shri Thanedar (D-Mich.), Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.), Dina Titus (D-Nev.), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.), Paul Tonko (D-N.Y.), Ritchie Torres (D-N.Y.), Lori Trahan (D-Mass.), Juan Vargas (D-Calif.), Nydia Velazquez (D-N.Y.), James Walkinshaw (D-Va.), Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-Fla.), Maxine Waters (D-Calif.), Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-N.J.), Nikema Williams (D-Ga.), and Frederica Wilson (D-Fla.).\n\nText of the lawmakers\u2019 argument is below, and the full brief can be viewed here.\n\nIntroduction\n\nAmici, as members of Congress, are keenly aware of the critical role that separation of powers plays in our constitutional democracy as a means to safeguard against the concentration of power within a single government branch. Separation of powers requires that the Executive Branch not usurp Congress\u2019s power to make laws; it mandates that the Executive Branch not override the Judiciary\u2019s power to declare what the law is; and it obligates the Judiciary to not shy from its duty to prevent Executive Branch overreach that upsets the carefully calibrated role each co-equal branch plays in our constitutional democracy.\n\nThe Northern District of California properly determined that the plain text of the TPS statute does not support the Secretary\u2019s argument that her actions are unreviewable. Nor does it support the Secretary\u2019s actions with respect to Venezuelan TPS. Instead, the Executive Branch\u2019s interpretation of the TPS statute essentially rewrites the statute to claim a power that Congress did not delegate to the Executive Branch.\n\nThe Secretary\u2019s actions not only violate the TPS statute but also contradict the bipartisan opposition to terminating Venezuela TPS. Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle have long supported temporary protected status for Venezuelans who fled dangerous conditions in their country\u2014conditions that persist today.\n\nAmici Members of Congress join Plaintiffs in urging the Court to affirm.\n\nArgument\n\nOn September 5, 2025, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs, setting aside: (1) Secretary Noem\u2019s vacatur of Venezuela\u2019s TPS extension, and (2) Secretary Noem\u2019s decision to terminate Venezuela\u2019s TPS status. (N.D. Cal., Dkt. 279 at p. 69). The district court denied the Secretary\u2019s request for a stay. Nat\u2019l TPS All. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-01766-EMC, 2025 WL 2617231, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2025).\n\nThis Court has twice rejected the Secretary\u2019s jurisdictional arguments, and it has twice concluded that the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits. See Nat\u2019l TPS All. v. Noem, --F. 4th--, No. 25-5724, 2025 WL 2661556 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2025) Nat\u2019l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000 (9th Cir. 2025). This Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment.\n\nI. The Executive Branch\u2019s erroneous claim of \u201cinherent\u201d power to assert its novel TPS interpretation usurps Congressional authority.\n\nAlthough the power to vacate a TPS extension is not mentioned in the statute, the Secretary contends that she \u201chas inherent authority to revoke or reconsider a TPS designation.\u201d (Sec.\u2019s Br. at 39-44). But this claim of \u201cinherent\u201d power must be assessed against the will of Congress. When the action taken\u2014here by the Secretary\u2014is \u201cincompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, . . . [the Executive Branch\u2019s] power is at its lowest ebb.\u201d Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).\n\nInstead of granting unfettered authority, Congress enacted the TPS statutory framework to limit the Executive Branch\u2019s discretion in making decisions related to temporary protected status, aiming to \u201creplac[e] . . . ad hoc, haphazard regulations and procedures.\u201d 135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep. Bill Richardson). Congress wanted to ensure that migrants are not \u201csubject to the vagaries of our domestic politics,\u201d id. (statement of Rep. Sander Levin), and that factors \u201cother than purely political ramifications be considered when granting this status to a nation\u2019s people,\u201d 133 Cong. Rec. (House) 21334 (1987) (statement of Rep. Mario Biaggi).\n\nThe Executive Branch incorrectly interprets the TPS statute to grant itself a power that is neither authorized by Congress nor consistent with the regulatory structure that Congress enacted. And \u201c[w]hen the separation of powers is at stake,\u201d the court does not \u201cjust throw up [its] hands.\u201d Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128, 168 (2019) (Gorsuch, J. dissenting). This Court must continue to guard against the Executive Branch\u2019s attempt to rewrite the TPS statute under the guise of \u201cinherent authority.\u201d\n\nContrary to any claim of \u201cinherent power,\u201d the Executive Branch does not have the \u201cpower to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice.\u201d Utility Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 327 (2014). As discussed below, the TPS statute is clear: if a foreign state\u2019s designation is terminated, such termination \u201cshall not be effective earlier than 60 days after the date the notice is published or, if later, the expiration of the most previous extension under subparagraph (C).\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(b)(3)(B). The Secretary cannot avoid that statutory scheme by granting itself a new power to vacate an extension. See infra Part II. And only the Secretary\u2019s \u201cdetermination[s]\u201d as to designations, terminations, or extensions are excluded from judicial review, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(b)(5)(A), not the question of statutory interpretation implicated by the Secretary\u2019s novel reading of the TPS statute. See infra Part II.A.\n\nAllowing the Secretary to rewrite the TPS statute to expand her powers beyond those granted by Congress \u201cwould deal a severe blow to the Constitution\u2019s separation of powers[,]\u201d Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 327, and upend precedent governing the Congress-Executive relationship that pre-dates the Civil War, see Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466, 424\u201325 (1883) (\u201cThe secretary of the treasury cannot by his regulations alter or amend a revenue law. All he can do is regulate the mode of proceeding to carry into effect what congress has enacted.\u201d); United States v. Williamson, 90 U.S. 411, 416 (1874) (\u201cIt is not in the power of the executive department, or any branch of it, to reduce the pay of an officer of the army. The regulation of the compensation . . . belongs to the legislative department of the government.\u201d).\n\nEven the Supreme Court cannot \u201crewrite clear statutes\u201d\u2014such as the TPS statute\u2014to address \u201cpolicy concerns.\u201d Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 587 U.S. 566, 581 (2019). Rather than act unilaterally, the executive \u201cmust take its complaints\u201d to Congress. Azar, 587 U.S. at 581.\n\nII. The Executive Branch intrudes further on congressional and judicial power by contending, contrary to the TPS statute, that the Secretary\u2019s decision is unreviewable.\n\nThe Executive Branch argues that 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review of the Secretary\u2019s vacatur of Venezuelan TPS. But as the district court, Nat\u2019l TPS All., 2025 WL 2578045, at *1, and this Court, Nat\u2019l TPS All., 2025 WL 2661556, at *2, correctly concluded, that is incorrect. Instead, the Executive Branch\u2019s position further violates the separation of powers because it claims an authority to prevent judicial review that was never granted to it by Congress.\n\n\u201cCongress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions.\u201d Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 402 (2024). \u201cCourts interpret statutes, no matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory construction, not individual policy preferences.\u201d Id. at 403. The Supreme Court \u201crecognize[s] a \u2018strong presumption in favor of judicial review\u201d in interpreting statutes, \u201cincluding statutes that may limit or preclude review.\u201d Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Com. for Intell. Prop., 579 U.S. 261, 273 (2016). This presumption may be overcome only \u201cby \u2018clear and convincing indications, drawn from \u2018specific language,\u2019 \u2018specific legislative history,\u2019 and \u2018inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole,\u2019 that Congress intended to bar review.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349\u201350 (1984)).\n\nThe crux of the Executive Branch\u2019s argument is that the Secretary\u2019s vacatur is encompassed in the determination of whether to extend a designation, such that judicial review of its interpretation of the TPS statute is barred. But that tautology presumes the answer to the question at hand: namely, does the TPS statute allow the Secretary to vacate a previous determination to extend a designation? That question\u2014apart from any particular \u201cdetermination\u201d of a designation, termination, or extension\u2014is one of statutory construction. It therefore falls within the province of judicial review. Proper analysis of a statute must defer to principles of statutory construction, including legislative intent, not the self-serving interpretation of an Executive Branch officer.\n\nA. The plain language of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) does not bar judicial review of the Secretary\u2019s vacatur.\n\nSection 1254a(b)(5)(A) states, \u201cThere is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(b)(5)(A). The Executive Branch argues that the statute unambiguously gives the Secretary unreviewable authority such that her decision to vacate the 2023 Designation extension is unreviewable.\n\nBut Congress drafted the bar on judicial review narrowly. First, the word \u201cvacatur\u201d was excluded from the types of determinations the Secretary makes, indicating that the Secretary\u2019s vacatur is outside of the scope of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A). Cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusion alteriusor expression of one is the exclusion of the other).\n\nSecond, the Executive Branch has asserted that the word \u201cany\u201d has an expansive meaning and captures \u201cdeterminations of whatever kind.\u201d This argument ignores the principle that courts \u201cmust give effect to every word of a statute wherever possible,\u201d Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (emphasis added), and ignores that \u201cany\u201d will mean \u201cdifferent things depending on the setting,\u201d Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004). Here, Congress expressly included a qualification: \u201cwith respect to designations, or terminations or extensions.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(b)(5)(A). These are categorical limitations\u2014the statute does not extend to \u201cdeterminations of whatever kind,\u201d but rather any determinations to designate, terminate or extend TPS. Any other interpretation renders the remaining words of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) superfluous. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (\u201c[It is] a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.\u201d).\n\nThird, the phrase \u201cwith respect to\u201d does not have the \u201cbroadening effect\u201d that the Executive Branch asserts. \u201c[T]he words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,\u201d Davis v. Michigan Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Here, the subject of \u201cwith respect to\u201d is \u201cany determination\u201d of a \u201cdesignation, or termination or extension of a designation.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(b)(5)(A). But the Executive Branch wants to extend the bar on judicial review to whether the TPS statute includes the unenumerated action, \u201cvacate,\u201d not to matters relating to the determination of designation, termination, or extension. Accepting the Executive Branch\u2019s interpretation of \u201cwith respect to\u201d means that Congress\u2019s qualification of \u201cany determination\u201d would necessarily submit to the whims of whatever the Executive Branch says is encompassed by the text of the statute. Cf. United States v. Miller, 145 S. Ct. 839, 853 (2025) (rejecting a broad reading of \u201cwith respect to\u201d when doing so defied the principle \u201cthat sovereign-immunity waiver must be construed narrowly\u201d).\n\nFinally, a narrow reading of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) to allow limited judicial review is consistent with the understanding that \u201cCongress acts intentionally and purposely.\u201d Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). If Congress intended to limit judicial review in all instances, Congress could \u201ceasily have used broader statutory language.\u201d McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991) (holding 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1160(e)(1) barred judicial review only to \u201cdirect review of individual denials of SAW status\u201d and not collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices); see also Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 53\u201356 (1993) (finding 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1255a(f) only barred judicial review of \u201cthe denial of an individual application\u201d while broader challenges not tied to such denials were not barred from judicial review); cf. Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 888\u201392 (9th Cir. 2020), aff\u2019g, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated, 59 F.4th 1010 (9th Cir. 2023) (agreeing with lower court that section 1254a(b)(5)(A) only barred judicial review of inquiries \u201cinto the underlying considerations and reasoning employed by the Secretary in reaching her country-specific TPS determinations\u201d but challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies considered collateral were reviewable). Because the plain reading of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) supports a narrow interpretation, the Court is not barred from reviewing the Secretary\u2019s vacatur of the 2023 Designation extension.\n\nB. Legislative history supports a narrow interpretation of the bar on judicial review.\n\nBeyond the statutory text, a narrow interpretation of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) is supported by this Court\u2019s \u201cwell-settled\u201d and \u201cstrong presumption\u201d favoring judicial review of administrative actions. McNary, 498 U.S. at 496. The Supreme Court has long held that \u201cwhen a statutory provision is reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with traditional understandings and basic principles: that executive determinations generally are subject to judicial review.\u201d Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 229 (2020) (citing Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251 (2010)) (internal quotations marks omitted). This presumption can only be overcome by \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d of congressional intent to preclude judicial review. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).\n\nDespite the Executive Branch\u2019s argument that it has long exercised inherent authority in this arena, Congress expressly enacted TPS to address prior concerns about the lack of criteria guiding the Executive Branch and the lack of transparency in the then-existing ad hoc process. Although Congress recognized the Executive Branch\u2019s unique role in matters of foreign policy, it understood that the Executive Branch could not have unfettered discretion in TPS determinations. As Representative Richardson explained in discussion over a predecessor safe haven bill in 1989, the goal was to \u201cestablish an orderly, systematic procedure for providing temporary protected status for nationals of countries undergoing civil war or extreme tragedy, because we need to replace the current ad hoc, haphazard regulations and procedures that exist today.\u201d 135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep. Bill Richardson). The Executive Branch\u2019s position amounts to an assertion that Congress created a detailed statutory scheme but then eliminated any mechanism to ensure the process was followed.\n\nThat is not the best reading of either the text or the relevant history. Instead, in Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) Congress preserved the Secretary\u2019s authority in matters uniquely within her purview while preserving judicial review on procedural issues arising under the TPS statute. Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) only bars judicial review of the Secretary\u2019s specific \u201cdetermination\u201d to designate, extend, or terminate designation of a particular foreign state based on the enumerated statutory framework. But acknowledgment of Executive authority in one respect does not equal an abdication of judicial authority in all.\n\nWhere \u201cCongress has made its intent clear, the Court must give effect to that intent.\u201d Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 328 (2000). Barring judicial review of the Secretary\u2019s vacatur ignores the congressional intent behind creating the TPS statute in the first place: to eliminate ad hoc designations and ensure the Executive follows a statutorily prescribed procedure. Because there are no \u201c\u2018clear and convincing indications, drawn from \u2018specific language,\u2019 \u2018specific legislative history,\u2019 and \u2018inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole,\u2019 that Congress intended to bar review,\u2019\u201d the presumption favoring judicial review controls. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 579 U.S. at 273.\n\nIII. The TPS statute does not allow for vacatur.\n\nThe plain language of the TPS statute does not authorize the Secretary to vacate designations or extensions of designations.\n\n\u201cStatutory interpretation must \u2018begi[n] with,\u2019 and ultimately heed, what a statute actually says.\u201d Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468 (2023) (quoting Nat\u2019l Assn. of Mfrs. v. Dep\u2019t of Def., 583 U.S. 109, 127 (2018)). This Court \u201cmust presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.\u201d Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005) (quoting Conn. Nat\u2019l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253\u201354 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n\u201cFederal agencies are creatures of statute. They possess only those powers that Congress confers upon them.\u201d Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. FDA, 3 F.4th 390, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Where, as here, there exists a question requiring statutory interpretation, \u201cas in any field of statutory interpretation, it is [the Court\u2019s] duty to respect not only what Congress wrote but, as importantly, what it didn\u2019t write.\u201d Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761, 765 (2019) (emphasis added).\n\nHere, the plain text and purpose of the TPS statute demonstrates that Congress did not authorize the Secretary to vacate an already-granted TPS extension or designation. The TPS statute describes a detailed process and time frame for the Secretary to implement designations, extensions, and terminations. It says nothing, however, about vacatur of extensions or designations that have already been granted.\n\nEven though the statute says nothing of vacatur, the Executive Branch argues that the Secretary has \u201cinherent authority\u201d to reconsider past decisions. Although it is true that administrative agencies possess \u201csome\u201d inherent authority to revisit their prior decisions, this argument oversimplifies the law and fails to recognize that \u201cany inherent reconsideration authority does not apply in cases where Congress has spoken.\u201d Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2014).\n\nCareful review of the Immigration and Nationality Act\u2019s (\u201cINA\u201d) statutory framework belies any argument that the TPS statute impliedly authorizes the Secretary to vacate prior designations and extensions. The TPS statute meticulously describes how the Secretary may designate, extend, and terminate temporary protected status, when such determinations take effect, and provides specific time periods that apply to each. For example, an initial designation \u201ctake[s] effect upon the date of publication of the designation\u201d and \u201cshall remain in effect until the effective date of the termination of the designation.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(b)(2).\n\nThe TPS statute is similarly prescriptive with respect to extensions and terminations. \u201cAt least 60 days before the end of the initial period of designation, and any extended period of designation,\u201d the Secretary \u201cafter consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government, shall review the conditions in the foreign state . . . and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation under this subsection continue to be met.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(b)(3)(A). The Secretary must \u201cprovide on a timely basis for the publication of notice of such determination . . . in the Federal Register.\u201d Id. If the Secretary determines \u201cthat a foreign state . . . no longer continues to meet the conditions for designation,\u201d the Secretary \u201cshall terminate the designation by publishing a notice in the Federal Register.\u201d Id. \u00a7 1254a(b)(3)(B). Without such a determination, the designation \u201cis extended.\u201d Id. \u00a7 1254a(b)(3)(A) & (C) (emphasis added). Extensions take effect immediately, and last for the length of time specified in the notice, up to 18 months. Id.\n\nIn contrast, a termination \u201cshall not be effective earlier than 60 days after the date the notice is published or, if later, the expiration of the most recent previous extension.\u201d Id. \u00a7 1254a(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Against this backdrop, the Executive Branch\u2019s claim that Secretary Noem had inherent authority to vacate the extension of the 2023 Designation is plainly at odds with this statutory framework. As noted, the statute expressly provides that termination of the TPS designation cannot occur earlier than the expiration of the \u201cmost recent previous extension\u201d\u2014that is, the 18-month extension that former Secretary Mayorkas granted on January 17, 2025.\n\nAlthough the Executive Branch complains that former Secretary Mayorkas extended the 2023 Designation before the statute required action, nothing in the TPS statute requires the Secretary to wait until the last second to review and grant extensions. Indeed, to the extent the Secretary seeks to extend an expiring designation extension, the TPS statute requires the Secretary to act \u201c[a]t least 60 days before end of the initial period of designation, and any extended period of designation.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(b)(3)(a) (emphasis added). That is, while the TPS statute sets the minimum amount of time before the expiration of a designation or extension to act (at least 60 days), it does not dictate how far in advance the Secretary may act. Secretary Noem\u2019s vacatur thus operates as an end-run around the statutory framework adopted by Congress because it effectively terminates a designation before its \u201cmost recent previous extension\u201d in violation of the TPS statute.\n\nThe lack of implied or inherent authority to vacate TPS designations or extensions is further confirmed by the language that Congress used to grant the Secretary revocation authority elsewhere in the INA. \u201cWhere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.\u201d Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.\n\nOther sections of the INA demonstrate that Congress granted the Secretary the authority to revisit and revoke prior approvals in more narrow circumstances. Under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1155, the Secretary \u201cmay, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 1154 of this title.\u201d 8 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1155. Congress could have, but did not, include similar language in the TPS statute. Exclusion of similar language in the TPS statute evinces Congress\u2019s intent to limit the Secretary\u2019s ability to revoke or vacate a prior approval outside of the termination procedure prescribed by Section 1254a(b)(3)(B).\n\nB. Congress created the TPS statutory framework to limit the Executive Branch from making arbitrary decisions and shield TPS from domestic politics.\n\nThe TPS statute\u2019s prohibition against the type of ad hoc vacatur attempted by Secretary Noem is further supported by the legislative history leading up to the TPS statute\u2019s passage. As discussed above, Congress\u2019s rationale behind passing TPS was to eliminate the Executive Branch\u2019s prior practice of granting humanitarian protection on an ad hoc basis through the practice of \u201cextended voluntary departure.\u201d See supra (discussing statement of Rep. Bill Richardson); see also 136 Cong. Rec. (House) 8686 (statement of Rep. Mary Rose Oakar) (\u201cAn orderly, systematic procedure for providing temporary protected status for nationals of countries undergoing war, civil war, or other extreme tragedy is needed to replace the current ad hoc haphazard procedure.\u201d). Specifically, Congress recognized the need to regularize the process of awarding humanitarian protection based on enumerated criteria to protect the decision from political pressures.\n\nAs is evident from the legislative history of the TPS statute, Congress anticipated the current political situation, where the current Secretary seeks to vacate TPS for a class of Venezuelan migrants even though the previous Secretary found, following the statutory framework of the TPS statute, that extending the designation of Venezuela was warranted. Venezuelans covered by the TPS extension are thus subject to the changing political winds and arbitrary action by the Executive Branch. This is precisely what Congress sought to avoid by passing the TPS statute.\n\nFor example, Representative Levin stated, \u201cPerhaps the most important aspect of this bill is that it will standardize the procedure for granting temporary stays of deportation. Refugees, spawned by the sad and tragic forces of warfare, should not be subject to the vagaries of our domestic politics as well. . . . Our recent domestic political squabble over the relative merits of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans as political refugees should never be repeated.\u201d 135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep. Sander Levin) (emphasis added). Similarly, Representative Brennan warned that the prior process of \u201cextended voluntary departure\u201d potentially sent migrants \u201cmixed messages which result from a vague or arbitrary policy.\u201d 135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep. Joseph Brennan).\n\nThese contemporaneous statements of various members of Congress reflect clear legislative intent to constrain executive discretion and replace the prior practice of providing nationality-based humanitarian protection on an ad hoc and opaque basis. The Executive Branch asks this Court to defer to its judgment and allow it to reinterpret the TPS statute in a way that will effectively negate it and return to the pre-TPS era. In the Secretary\u2019s view, the outcome of the last election justifies her ability to vacate her predecessor\u2019s extension decision, which if upheld, would result in the immediate termination of TPS for the approximately 472,000 individuals previously subject to the 2023 Designation. See 88 Fed. Reg. 68130, 68134 (Oct. 3, 2023). Overnight, these individuals\u2019 lives would be completely upended. That is precisely the kind of \u201chaphazard\u201d process the TPS statute was designed to prevent from occurring to individuals deserving of humanitarian protection.\n\nIV. Venezuela TPS has long enjoyed bipartisan congressional support.\n\nMembers on both sides of the Congressional aisle have long recognized the ongoing interest in maintaining the Venezuela TPS designation. On March 7, 2019, for example, then-Senator Marco Rubio, alongside Senators Durbin, Menendez, and Schumer, led a bipartisan group of 24 senators urging President Trump to designate Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status, highlighting the country\u2019s deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions.\n\nNot long afterward, on July 25, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 549, the Venezuela TPS Act of 2019. See H.R. 549, 116th Cong. (2019). Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart commented, \u201cToday, the House of Representatives was able to gather the strong, bipartisan support needed to pass [the Act which would grant] temporary protected status in the United States until it is safe for them to return to Venezuela.\u201d Unfortunately, despite several efforts, the Senate was unable to pass the Act, and it was left to President Trump on his last day in office to provide temporary legal status through a different pathway, the Deferred Enforced Departure program. Memorandum on Deferred Enforced Departure for Certain Venezuelans, 86 Fed. Reg. 6845 (Jan. 19, 2021).\n\nIn March 2021, the Department of Homeland Security granted TPS eligibility to Venezuelans. This grant received bipartisan acclaim, including from then-Senator Rubio, who underscored that it was President Trump who had first offered Venezuelans protection from deportation. Then-Senator Rubio further stated he was \u201cglad the Biden administration share[d] that commitment\u201d to Venezuelans. Along with then-Senator Bob Menendez, in March 2022 then-Senator Rubio urged Secretary Mayorkas to \u201credesignate Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status,\u201d explaining that \u201c[e]xtending this designation is absolutely essential for eligible Venezuelans currently in the United States who are unable to return to their homeland due to the dire conditions in that country.\u201d\n\nSince then, members of Congress from both sides of the aisle have continued to support Venezuela TPS and the communities in this country where many Venezuelans have found temporary refuge. Shortly after President Trump took office in January 2025, three Republican representatives from Florida, Representatives Mario D\u00edaz-Balart (FL-26), Carlos A. Gim\u00e9nez (FL-28), and Mar\u00eda Elvira Salazar (FL-27), released a joint statement in support of Venezuela TPS, observing that, as a result of the TPS designation, \u201cmany Venezuelans have arrived in our country and have integrated into our communities, respecting our laws and contributing to the prosperity of our great country.\u201d\n\nThat support has continued during this litigation. Following the Northern District of California\u2019s March 31, 2025, order postponing Secretary Noem\u2019s attempted vacatur of Venezuela TPS, Representative Salazar posted about the Secretary\u2019s preliminary loss on X: \u201cGREAT NEWS! @DHSgov and @SecNoem will be extending TPS status for Venezuelans for another 18 months. I\u2019ve led the fight on this and been asking for MONTHS! Thank you to the Administration for doing the right thing.\u201d\n\nAfter the Supreme Court\u2019s May 21, 2025, ruling on the Secretary\u2019s first stay application, Representatives D\u00edaz-Balart, Gim\u00e9nez, and Salazar issued another joint statement in support of Venezuela TPS, emphasizing that they \u201cwill continue . . . working with the Trump administration on a permanent solution.\u201d Rep. Gim\u00e9nez has even written directly to Secretary Noem \u201cto address the urgent situation regarding the decision to end the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for roughly 600,000 Venezuelans living here in the United States,\u201d urging the Trump Administration to find a solution. And in May 2025, a bipartisan group of members of the House of Representatives introduced the Venezuela TPS Act of 2025, which proposed to designate TPS for Venezuelans to \u201cprotect approximately 600,000 Venezuelans in the United States from deportation.\u201d\n\nThis bipartisan support is so strong because not much has changed in Venezuela since then-Senator Rubio wrote in March 2022, that extending Venezuela TPS was \u201cabsolutely essential . . . due to the dire conditions\u201d there. As of May 12, 2025, the State Department\u2019s Level 4: Do not Travel warning for Venezuela states: \u201cDo not travel to or remain in Venezuela due to the high risk of wrongful detention, torture in detention, terrorism, kidnapping, arbitrary enforcement of local laws, crime, civil unrest, and poor health infrastructure.\u201d\n\nAmici Members of Congress have a strong interest not only in preserving the benefits that Venezuela TPS affords their constituents\u2019 communities but also in protecting the designation and termination process that is enshrined in the TPS statute and that guards against the type of arbitrary and political vacatur that took place here. Amici urge this Court to affirm the district court\u2019s ruling.\n\nConclusion\n\nAmici Members of Congress ask this Court to affirm.\n\n###", 1, "2026-03-30T01:40:41Z", "2026-04-06T19:52:45Z"]], "columns": ["url", "title", "date", "year", "month", "party", "chamber", "state", "member_name", "bioguide_id", "domain", "scraper", "source", "date_source", "text", "has_text", "collected_at", "updated_at"], "primary_keys": ["url"], "primary_key_values": ["https://ansari.house.gov/media/press-releases/ansari-urging-court-uphold-protected-status-for-venezuela"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 1.4343131333589554, "source": "dwillis/congress-press", "source_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press", "license": "MIT", "license_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press/blob/main/LICENSE"}