{"database": "press", "table": "releases", "rows": [["https://fernandez.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=646", "N.M. Delegation Demands Answers After Reports of DEA Declining to Seize Massive Fentanyl Shipments, Calls for Immediate Reforms to Stop Deadly Fentanyl from Reaching New Mexico Communities", "2026-07-10", "2026", "2026-07", "Democrat", "House", "NM", "Teresa Leger Fernandez", "L000273", "fernandez.house.gov", "fernandez", "https://fernandez.house.gov/media/press-releases", "scraper", "WASHINGTON \u2014 U.S. Representatives Teresa Leger Fern\u00e1ndez (D-N.M.), Melanie Stansbury (D-N.M.), and Gabe Vasquez (D-N.M.) and U.S. Senators Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) and Ben Ray Luj\u00e1n (D-N.M.) sent a letter demanding answers from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator Terrance Cole on why the DEA allowed large quantities of fentanyl to circulate unseized in New Mexico communities.\n\nTrafficking of fentanyl and other opioids poses one of the most severe \u2014 and often deadly \u2014 public health threats facing New Mexico and the nation. Illicit fentanyl, a Schedule I controlled substance, is an exceptionally potent synthetic opioid that can be fatal even in extremely small quantities. Illicitly manufactured fentanyl has been the primary driver of the overdose epidemic in the U.S.\n\nWhistleblower complaints allege that Albuquerque-based DEA agents declined to interdict at least 1.8 million fentanyl pills between 2023 and 2025 in hopes of taking down a larger supply chain.\n\n\u201cWe unequivocally assert that allowing fentanyl to go unseized creates an unconscionable risk to New Mexicans,\u201d the lawmakers wrote to DEA Administrator Cole.\n\nIn 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and DEA established \"Fentanyl Protocols\" directing agents to \"seize or otherwise prevent the distribution\" of fentanyl \"as soon as practicable\" to protect public safety. In 2024, the DOJ revised those protocols to provide law enforcement with greater discretion, allowing agents to weigh public safety risks against \"the benefits to be achieved through preserving the investigation.\" A 2024 DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigative summary further states that the U.S. Attorney's Office acted reasonably in allowing certain drugs to remain unseized and concluded that doing so posed no \"specific danger to public health and safety.\"\n\n\u201cWe adamantly disagree with this internal assessment, and we urge your agency to immediately revert fentanyl protocols to the 2017 standard of seize or otherwise prevent the distribution of fentanyl as soon as practicable,\u201d the lawmakers underscored. \u201cWe will be taking all necessary actions in Congress to better ensure the safety of New Mexicans and expect that you will stand with us in those efforts.\u201d The lawmakers concluded their letter by demanding responses to a request for written documentation on all instances where the DEA declined to interdict fentanyl, and the following questions on the DEA's fentanyl interdiction policies, investigative protocols, and enforcement practices:\n\nProvide comprehensive written documentation of all individual instances, occurring in New Mexico since January 2017, including dates, locations and amount of suspected contraband, during which DEA has declined to interdict fentanyl in the course of a Title III or electronic surveillance investigation. Please also indicate the extent to which fentanyl involved in these investigations was ultimately recovered.\n\nWhat are DEA\u2019s current internal directives and guidelines dictating how federal agents manage active drug-trafficking investigations involving fentanyl? Specifically, what protocols instruct agents on whether to seize a shipment of fentanyl immediately or allow it to pass temporarily under surveillance?\n\nWhat internal DOJ or DEA documentation determines, or may supersede, official fentanyl interdiction and operational protocols both as a matter of agency-wide policy and also with regards to individual drug-trafficking investigations? How are these changes to operational protocols communicated to agents in the field? Please provide all such documentation since January 2017.\n\nUnder what circumstances are DEA agents permitted to exercise discretion, abandoning any presumption of interdiction, allowing a fentanyl transaction to proceed without immediate seizure? What safeguards are in place to protect communities when fentanyl shipments are allowed to continue as part of an ongoing investigation?\n\nMust agents possess a guaranteed, continuous ability to seize the substance immediately if the operational environment changes? How is the likelihood of losing operational surveillance, and the potential number of lives impacted if the substance enters the illicit supply chain, measured against the benefits of a successful investigation?\n\nWhat circumstances mandate when fentanyl must be safely interdicted, or swapped for a controlled delivery with a substituted substance, before it is allowed to advance within the supply chain? What levels of approval within your command structure are required to bypass immediate interdiction?\n\nWhat other tactics such as controlled deliveries, enhanced surveillance, contraband substitution are available to your agency to facilitate long-term, high-level investigations without an unacceptable risk to public safety? What resources can we provide to make these tactics of more common use to your agency?\n\nWhat is the reassignment status of DEA personnel based in New Mexico to out-of-state enforcement efforts since January 2025? During the same period, have DEA agents in New Mexico maintained their primary focus on drug-trafficking investigations or have any participated in joint immigration enforcement operations not limited to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations?\n\nFor more information on the N.M. Delegation\u2019s work to tackle the opioid crisis, click here.\n\nThe full text of the letter is here and below:\n\nDear Administrator Cole:\n\nWe write with urgent concern following investigative reporting revealing that U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents may have allowed large quantities of fentanyl to circulate unseized in New Mexico communities. These reports include whistleblower complaints alleging that Albuquerque-based agents declined to interdict at least 1.8 million fentanyl pills between 2023 and 2025 in hopes of taking down a larger supply chain. We unequivocally assert that allowing fentanyl to go unseized creates an unconscionable risk to New Mexicans. Furthermore, given the seriousness of these allegations and potential ongoing threats to public safety, we require immediate responses regarding your agency\u2019s fentanyl interdiction and operational protocols.\n\nIllicit fentanyl poses a uniquely severe, and often deadly, public health crisis in New Mexico and across the country. Pharmaceutical fentanyl, a schedule II substance, is an exceptionally potent synthetic opioid, posing a severe risk of fatality even in extremely small quantities. Its potency is estimated to be significantly higher than other opioids, approximately 50 times stronger than heroin and 100 times stronger than morphine. Because fentanyl is so powerful, even an extremely small amount \u2014 roughly equivalent to a few grains of salt \u2014 can be a lethal dose. The illegal diversion of pharmaceutical fentanyl most often occurs through supply chain theft, prescription fraud, and rogue actors within the medical system. Unlike pharmaceutical fentanyl, illicitly manufactured fentanyl is mainly produced in clandestine laboratories without approved precursor chemicals and is largely responsible for the overdose crisis in the U.S. Illicit fentanyl and its analogs, schedule I substances, are unregulated lab-made variations of pharmaceutical fentanyl often supplied by drug cartels. Illicit manufacturers frequently mix it into other drugs, such as heroin, cocaine, and counterfeit pills. This means individuals are often unaware they are ingesting it, which significantly increases the risk of accidental overdose. Because of the variability in illegal drug manufacturing, the amount of synthetic opioid varies widely from pill to pill and, as acknowledged by your agency, a single pill can easily result in a fatal overdose.\n\nInternal DEA documentation indicating shifting agency fentanyl interdiction and operational protocols, without necessary consultation with various Congressional oversight authorities, is of paramount importance to our inquiry. Public reporting has focused on U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and DEA \u201cFentanyl Protocols,\u201d established in 2017, mandating that agents \u201cseize or otherwise prevent the distribution\u201d of fentanyl \u201cas soon as practicable\u201d to protect public safety. Subsequently, in 2024, reporting states that DOJ updated these protocols to give law enforcement more discretion, allowing agents to balance public safety risks against \u201cthe benefits to be achieved through preserving the investigation.\u201d Confirmation of this posture is recorded in a DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 2024 investigative summary, concluding that the U.S. Attorney's Office had made reasonable decisions by allowing drugs to go unseized and that their inaction posed no \u201cspecific danger to public health and safety.\u201d We adamantly disagree with this internal assessment, and we urge your agency to immediately revert fentanyl protocols to the 2017 standard of seize or otherwise prevent the distribution of fentanyl as soon as practicable.\n\nWe appreciate that you recently asked DOJ\u2019s Office of Inspector General (OIG) to begin an internal, independent investigation of the reported allegations. While we have no interest in interfering with the OIG\u2019s progress, we require immediate responses to the following, no later than 10 days from your receipt of this letter, so that we may take appropriate legislative action to reign in any discretionary authority erroneously presumed.\n\nProvide comprehensive written documentation of all individual instances, occurring in New Mexico since January 2017, including dates, locations and amount of suspected contraband, during which DEA has declined to interdict fentanyl in the course of a Title III or electronic surveillance investigation. Please also indicate the extent to which fentanyl involved in these investigations was ultimately recovered.\n\nWhat are DEA\u2019s current internal directives and guidelines dictating how federal agents manage active drug-trafficking investigations involving fentanyl? Specifically, what protocols instruct agents on whether to seize a shipment of fentanyl immediately or allow it to pass temporarily under surveillance?\n\nWhat internal DOJ or DEA documentation determines, or may supersede, official fentanyl interdiction and operational protocols both as a matter of agency-wide policy and also with regards to individual drug-trafficking investigations? How are these changes to operational protocols communicated to agents in the field? Please provide all such documentation since January 2017.\n\nUnder what circumstances are DEA agents permitted to exercise discretion, abandoning any presumption of interdiction, allowing a fentanyl transaction to proceed without immediate seizure? What safeguards are in place to protect communities when fentanyl shipments are allowed to continue as part of an ongoing investigation?\n\nMust agents possess a guaranteed, continuous ability to seize the substance immediately if the operational environment changes? How is the likelihood of losing operational surveillance, and the potential number of lives impacted if the substance enters the illicit supply chain, measured against the benefits of a successful investigation?\n\nWhat circumstances mandate when fentanyl must be safely interdicted, or swapped for a controlled delivery with a substituted substance, before it is allowed to advance within the supply chain? What levels of approval within your command structure are required to bypass immediate interdiction?\n\nWhat other tactics such as controlled deliveries, enhanced surveillance, contraband substitution are available to your agency to facilitate long-term, high-level investigations without an unacceptable risk to public safety? What resources can we provide to make these tactics of more common use to your agency?\\\n\nWhat is the reassignment status of DEA personnel based in New Mexico to out-of-state enforcement efforts since January 2025? During the same period, have DEA agents in New Mexico maintained their primary focus on drug-trafficking investigations or have any participated in joint immigration enforcement operations not limited to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations?\n\nPlease provide a detailed timeline regarding actions taken by the DEA since these whistleblower allegations came to your attention. Will DEA now direct all federal agents involved in drug-trafficking investigations to seize or otherwise prevent the distribution of fentanyl as soon as practicable?\n\nThis situation requires that your responses be compiled and returned with the same urgency with which we\u2019ve submitted our inquiries. We will be taking all necessary actions in Congress to better ensure the safety of New Mexicans and expect that you will stand with us in those efforts.\n\nSincerely,", 1, "2026-07-14T07:08:55Z", "2026-07-14T07:10:52Z"]], "columns": ["url", "title", "date", "year", "month", "party", "chamber", "state", "member_name", "bioguide_id", "domain", "scraper", "source", "date_source", "text", "has_text", "collected_at", "updated_at"], "primary_keys": ["url"], "primary_key_values": ["https://fernandez.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=646"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 2.2076989989727736, "source": "dwillis/congress-press", "source_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press", "license": "MIT", "license_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press/blob/main/LICENSE"}