{"database": "press", "table": "releases", "rows": [["https://web.archive.org/web/20140221043201/http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=47737", "Internal Memo Outlines National Security Concerns with EB-5 Immigration Program", "2013-12-12", "2013", "2013-12", "Republican", "House", "IA", "Charles Grassley", "G000386", "web.archive.org", null, null, "legacy", "WASHINGTON \u2013 Senator Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today pressed the administration for answers about an Immigration and Customs Enforcement memo that raises significant national security questions about the EB-5 visa program, which is an avenue for foreign investors to participate in potential, new commercial enterprises in the United States in exchange for a U.S. visa.\u00a0 The memo was written by the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) arm of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In a letter to Immigration and Customs Enforcement Acting Director John Sandweg, Grassley wrote, \u201cThe HSI memo makes clear that overall, HSI believes the Regional Center model has significant flaws\u2026\u201d\u00a0 Grassley also said the memo identified several areas of vulnerability within the EB-5 visa program.\u00a0 The memo questioned whether the vulnerabilities could be fixed in order to \u201censure the integrity of the program.\u201d Grassley was especially concerned about a section of the memo that outlines how the EB-5 program \u201cmay be abused by Iranian operatives to infiltrate the United States.\u201d\u00a0 According to the memo, HSI became concerned about the program while investigating operatives who allegedly \u201cfacilitate terrorism and are involved in an illicit procurement network that exports items to Iran...\u201d\u00a0 Here\u2019s a copy of the text of Grassley\u2019s letter to Sandweg.\u00a0 A copy of the memo and letter can be found here. December 12, 2013 VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION John Sandweg  \nActing Director  \nU.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  \nU.S. Department of Homeland Security  \n500 12th Street, SW  \nWashington, D.C. 20536 Dear Acting Director Sandweg: \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 I write to inquire about an internal U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) memo that raises significant questions about U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services\u2019 (USCIS\u2019s) EB-5 Regional Center program.\u00a0 The memo is from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), an investigative arm of ICE.\u00a0 It appears to have been written in response to a request from Secretary Janet Napolitano. One section of the memo outlines \u201cconcerns that this particular visa program [EB-5] may be abused by Iranian operatives to infiltrate the United States . . . .\u201d1 \u00a0 Two of the operatives allegedly \u201cfacilitate terrorism and are involved in an illegal procurement network that exports items to Iran for use by \u2018secret\u2019 Iranian government agencies.\u201d2 \u00a0 According to the memo, one of the operatives acted as a representative in the U.S. for an Iranian front company allegedly run by an individual associated with Iran\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.3 This is not the first time that Iranian operatives have been discovered operating in the United States.\u00a0 In this spring of this year, Manssor Arbabsiar, who had both Iranian and U.S. passports, was sentenced for plotting with Iranian military officials to kill the Saudi Arabian ambassador by bombing a Washington, D.C. restaurant.4 \u00a0 Earlier this fall, news outlets reported that the U.S. had intercepted an order from Iran to attack U.S. interests in the event of a strike on Syria.5 \u00a0 In light of these facts, it is alarming to see documentation that appears to indicate Iranian operatives used the EB-5 program to try to obtain visas for their associates. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 According to the HSI memo, ICE identified seven main areas of program vulnerability with the EB-5 visa: 1)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Export of sensitive technology/economic espionage;  \n2)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Use by foreign government agents/espionage;  \n3)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Use by terrorists;  \n4)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Investment fraud by regional center;  \n5)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Investment fraud by investors;  \n6)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Fraud conspiracies by investors and regional center; and  \n7)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Illicit finance/money laundering.6 The memo states: \u201cThe aforementioned vulnerabilities are directly affected by information gaps on the alien beneficiaries of the EB-5 program.\u00a0 Unlike most other permanent resident visa classifications, EB-5 beneficiaries do not need to establish a significant and verifiable background for program eligibility.\u201d7 \u00a0 According to the memo, HSI made several suggestions for both information collection fixes and legislative fixes to close loopholes in the EB-5 program.\u00a0 Of the information collection fixes, the memo states: \u201cHSI proposed making changes to the USCIS forms (I-526, I-829, I-924, and I-924A) that are used by RC\u2019s [regional centers] and alien investors.\u00a0 HSI felt that the forms did not collect enough information to determine the validity of either the RC\u2019s, the alien investors or the source of the investor\u2019s funds.\u201d8 The legislative changes proposed by HSI were: (1) doubling the minimum investment amount, (2) limiting the program to allow only active investors involved in managing and directing a business enterprise, and (3) eliminating the consideration of induced jobs for meeting the requirements of the program.\u00a0 These suggestions were not included in the technical assistance provided by USCIS in June 2012 when the EB-5 program was being reauthorized.\u00a0 The only HSI recommendation which appeared in any form in the technical assistance was a proposal for providing inflationary adjustments to the minimum investment amount, which is very different from doubling it. The HSI memo makes clear that overall, HSI believes the Regional Center model has significant flaws and should be abandoned: \u201cThe principal change proposed by HSI was that the Regional Center Model be allowed to sunset, as HSI maintains there are no safeguards that can be put in place that will ensure the integrity of the RC model.\u201d Given these concerns with the EB-5 Regional Center program and information gaps on recipients of EB-5 visas, it is important that Congress have statistics on what happens after individuals enter the U.S. on an EB-5 visa.\u00a0 Foreign investors who participate in the EB-5 program may receive conditional permanent residence for a two-year period.\u00a0 However, it seems unlikely that they are ever removed from the country even if the conditions of their conditional status are not met because the required jobs weren\u2019t created within the required period. Therefore, please respond to the following: 1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Please produce all legislative and information collection recommendations made by ICE or any of its divisions for the EB-5 program.\u00a0 Please provide in detail any specific changes recommended for USCIS forms I-526, I-829, I-924, and I-924A. 2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 For each of the above recommendations, please identify the date ICE proposed the recommendation and to what entities it was proposed. 3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 What is the current total number of EB-5 conditional residents whose request to remove conditional status was denied? 4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Does ICE know how many EB-5 investors who were denied permanent resident status remain in the country?\u00a0 Does ICE know the location of these foreign investors?\u00a0 If so, please provide a status report, including how many are detained, how many are in removal proceedings, and how many have been removed from the country by ICE. 5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Do you or your agency have any information as to why USCIS did not provide Congress with the legislative recommendations made by HSI, as indicated in the attached memo? 6.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 What is ICE doing to help ensure that USCIS does not provide EB-5 visas to individuals and entities that are involved in international terrorism or proliferation operations, as was the case with Iranian operatives whose goal was to infiltrate the U.S. and export items back to their country? 7.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 What is the current status of the Iranian case mentioned in the memo? 8.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 What type of visas did the two Iranian operatives mentioned in the memo enter the U.S. on? 9.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Is the principal of the regional center referenced in the memo in the United States?\u00a0 If so, what type of visa did the principal enter the U.S. on? 10.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 For each individual associated with the principal of the regional center through TECS subrecord hits, please indicate whether or not the individual has entered the U.S. in the past or is currently in the U.S., as well as what type of visa each individual entered the U.S. on. 11.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 What is the current immigration status of each of the individuals referenced in questions 8, 9, and 10? Thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter.\u00a0 Please respond to these questions by January 1, 2014.\u00a0 Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact XXXX of my staff at (202) 224-5225.\u00a0 I look forward to your prompt response. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Sincerely, \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Charles E. Grassley  \n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ranking Member  \n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Committee on the Judiciary  \n 1\u00a0 Undated memo, \u201cEB-5 Program Questions from DHS Secretary,\u201d Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [Attachment 1].  \n2\u00a0 Id. at 2.  \n3\u00a0 Id.  \n4\u00a0 Press release, \u201cManssor Arbabsiar Sentenced in New York City Federal Court to 25 Years in Prison for Conspiring with Iranian Military Officials to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States,\u201d Department of Justice, May 30, 2013, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/May/13-nsd-621.html.  \n5\u00a0 Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entous, \u201cIran Plots Revenge, U.S. Says,\u201d Wall Street Journal (Sep. 6, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323893004579057271019210230.html.  \n6\u00a0 Undated memo, \u201cEB-5 Program Questions from DHS Secretary,\u201d Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, at 4.  \n7\u00a0 Id.  \n8\u00a0 Id., at 5.  \n9\u00a0 Id., at 4.", 1, "2026-03-30T12:14:52Z", "2026-03-30T12:14:52Z"]], "columns": ["url", "title", "date", "year", "month", "party", "chamber", "state", "member_name", "bioguide_id", "domain", "scraper", "source", "date_source", "text", "has_text", "collected_at", "updated_at"], "primary_keys": ["url"], "primary_key_values": ["https://web.archive.org/web/20140221043201/http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=47737"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.8656750433146954, "source": "dwillis/congress-press", "source_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press", "license": "MIT", "license_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press/blob/main/LICENSE"}