{"database": "press", "table": "releases", "rows": [["https://www.bennet.senate.gov/2026/11/11/bennet-presses-trump-administration-on-failure-to-stop-megaspeeds-apparent-ai-tech-diversion-to-china/", "Bennet Presses Trump Administration on Failure to Stop Megaspeed\u2019s Apparent AI Tech Diversion to China", "2026-11-11", "2026", "2026-11", "Democrat", "Senate", "CO", "Michael F. Bennet", "B001267", "www.bennet.senate.gov", "bennet", "https://www.bennet.senate.gov/news/page/", "scraper", "Washington, D.C. \u2014 Colorado U.S. Senator Michael Bennet, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, Attorney General Todd Blanche, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton demanding an update on the U.S. government\u2019s investigation into Megaspeed, a Singapore-based firm that reportedly acts as a major conduit for transfers of restricted U.S. technology to China, including Nvidia\u2019s advanced AI chips.\n\nThe letter also requests U.S. engagement with Southeast Asian governments to address potential violations of U.S. export controls; punitive U.S. action against Megaspeed, such as putting the firm on the Entity List; and far stronger approaches to export controls and enforcement. Additionally, the letter requests an explanation of the Intelligence Community (IC)\u2019s analysis of the threat Megaspeed poses, as well as an explanation of the IC\u2019s sharing of that information with the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, and the White House. These efforts are crucial given reports that the IC concluded a Megaspeed executive was a Chinese intelligence asset with close ties to Nvidia\u2019s CEO.\n\n\u201cI request an update on the U.S. government\u2019s investigation into the Singapore-based firm Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd. (\u201cMegaspeed\u201d) for potentially circumventing U.S. export controls and exploiting gray areas in the U.S. export control regime to divert advanced American semiconductor capabilities to China, including advanced Nvidia semiconductors. The Department of Commerce\u2019s Bureau of Industry and Security initially led this investigation but New York Times reporting indicates that the Department of Justice is now leading this effort. Additionally, we request that you engage countries hosting Megaspeed infrastructure \u2013 such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia \u2013 to address potential violations of U.S. export controls. I also request your consideration of specific punitive measures against Megaspeed, as well as stronger approaches to export controls and enforcement,\u201d Bennet wrote.\n\n\u201cThis flow of advanced AI chips to China and China\u2019s access to restricted cloud computing capabilities risk enabling Beijing\u2019s development of autonomous weapon systems, advanced cyber-warfare capabilities, and more powerful surveillance tools \u2013 which could eventually pose significant challenges to U.S. capabilities. China\u2019s military could one day use these technologies against American servicemembers. Large-scale diversion also creates a gray market that penalizes law-abiding companies and devalues the intellectual property that sustains U.S. global economic leadership,\u201d he continued.\n\nThe letter concluded by requesting that Secretary Lutnick, Attorney General Blanche, Secretary Rubio, and Director Clayton provide the following information by November 24, 2026:\n\nAn update on the Department of Justice\u2019s continuation of the Department of Commerce investigation into Megaspeed;\n\nA detailed description of any Department of Commerce efforts to prevent Megaspeed, whose top executive is reportedly a Chinese intelligence asset, from purchasing Nvidia chips, such as by sending an \u201cIs Informed\u201d letter to Nvidia blocking certain semiconductor shipments to Megaspeed and potentially placing Megaspeed on the Entity List;\n\nA detailed accounting of:\n\nThe Department of Commerce and Department of State\u2019s efforts to coordinate a rigorous response with partners including Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia;\n\nThe Department of Commerce\u2019s efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow Chinese companies to access restricted U.S. technology, such as semiconductors and cloud computing, through Southeast Asia; and\n\nThe Department of Commerce\u2019s efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow subsidiaries of China-headquartered firms, including those on whom the United States has already sanctioned, to buy export-controlled AI chips in the United States.\n\nA detailed explanation of the IC\u2019s analysis of Alice Huang\u2019s reported service as a Chinese intelligence asset and the broader threat Megaspeed poses to U.S. national security.\n\nA detailed explanation of the IC\u2019s sharing of such information, on Ms. Huang; and Megaspeed, with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the White House.\n\nBennet has led efforts to ensure U.S. competitiveness and national security by preventing the transfer of advanced U.S. technologies to China. He helped pass legislation to bar American investments in certain advanced technologies with military uses, such as AI and semiconductors, in China and other countries of concern. He secured language in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence-passed Fiscal Year 2027 Intelligence Authorization Act requiring an intelligence assessment before the U.S. government approves AI technologies for export or signs an AI agreement with a foreign government. That assessment would evaluate the recipient country\u2019s export control regime, its ties to adversaries like China and Russia, the risk of onward proliferation, and the likely end-uses of the technology. Bennet has blasted the Trump administration\u2019s decision to allow the sale of Nvidia H200 AI chips to China and President Trump\u2019s decision to pause U.S. export controls restricting the sale of critical technology to China.\n\nThe text of the letter is available HERE and below.\n\nSecretary Lutnick, Attorney General Blanche, Secretary Rubio, and Director Clayton:\n\nI request an update on the U.S. government\u2019s investigation into the Singapore-based firm Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd. (\u201cMegaspeed\u201d) for potentially circumventing U.S. export controls and exploiting gray areas in the U.S. export control regime to divert advanced American semiconductor capabilities to China, including advanced Nvidia semiconductors. The Department of Commerce\u2019s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) initially led this investigation, but New York Times reporting indicates that the Department of Justice is now leading this effort. Additionally, I request that you engage countries hosting Megaspeed infrastructure \u2013 such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia \u2013 to address potential violations of U.S. export controls. I also request your consideration of specific punitive measures against Megaspeed, as well as stronger approaches to export controls and enforcement.\n\nThese efforts are crucial and time-sensitive given New York Times reporting that the U.S. intelligence community found Megaspeed executive Alice Huang to be a Chinese intelligence asset who passed critical information to the Chinese government. Ensuring the integrity of our export controls is central to advancing America\u2019s national security and our long-term economic prosperity, including by preventing China \u2013 our only near-peer competitor \u2013 from obtaining advanced U.S. technologies with military applications, such as cutting-edge artificial intelligence (AI) chips. Our export control regime must be able to identify and curtail entities actively seeking to evade those controls.\n\nExtensive public reporting suggests that Megaspeed acts as a high-volume conduit for China-bound transfers of advanced American technology through the following activities:\n\nIntelligence Operations: According to The New York Times, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that a top executive at Megaspeed, Alice Huang (also known as Huang Le), acted as a Chinese intelligence asset to gather information for Beijing. Per this report, electronic surveillance revealed that Ms. Huang cultivated a close relationship with Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang. The report also indicated that Ms. Huang likely funneled information not only about Nvidia to the Chinese government, but also about President Trump\u2019s plans and intentions. The report indicates that Megaspeed continues to trumpet its close connections to Nvidia.\n\nExploitation of Sanctioned Intermediaries: Reports indicate that Megaspeed operated as a middle man, using Aivres \u2013 a U.S.-registered subsidiary of Chinese technology giant Inspur, on which the United States imposed sanctions for supporting China\u2019s military \u2013 to source restricted hardware, such as advanced Nvidia AI chips. Aivres was able to purchase this hardware (1) because Aivres was not subject to the sanctions imposed on its parent company Inspur; (2) because the Department of Commerce has rolled back steps that restrict the subsidiaries of Chinese-headquartered firms from buying export-controlled AI chips from U.S. firms; and (3) because the Department of Commerce halted enforcement of licensing requirements for Chinese-headquartered subsidiaries in Malaysia from May 2025, creating more loopholes that have enabled the illicit diversion of sensitive U.S. technology. Aivres thus continued purchasing advanced Nvidia chips, which a Malaysia-based Megaspeed subsidiary then bought. BIS officials who visited Megaspeed\u2019s Malaysia data center suspected that Megaspeed may have sent some of these chips to China. Meanwhile, Aivres currently advertises access to Nvidia\u2019s most advanced and recently released Vera Rubin chips.\n\nPhysical Smuggling and Diversion: Reports indicate that since 2023, Megaspeed\u2019s Malaysian and Indonesian subsidiaries have purchased advanced Nvidia chips worth at least $4.6 billion, including the advanced Blackwell processors that the United States has not approved for export to China. A late 2024 BIS inspection of a Megaspeed site in Malaysia discovered advanced hardware in boxes rather than installed and in use, an unusual practice that BIS officials considered a potential indicator of diversion to China.\n\nBackdoor Remote Access: Reports indicate that Megaspeed operates AI data centers in Southeast Asia, potentially with Nvidia Blackwell processors, and may have used them to provide Chinese clients with remote cloud computing power from restricted U.S. hardware. As of October 29, 2026, Nvidia continued to list Megaspeed on its website as a cloud partner. This highlights another gap in current U.S. export control regulations, since the administration has not imposed restrictions to prevent companies headquartered in countries outside of China, like Megaspeed, from providing Chinese clients remote access to export-controlled chips.\n\nOpaque Ownership: Reports indicate that Megaspeed is a spin-off of 7ROAD, a Chinese firm with state-backed ties \u2013 raising concerns of corporate restructuring obscuring Beijing\u2019s control in order to evade U.S. oversight. Recent probes underscore the severity of these allegations. The Singapore Police Force has investigated Megaspeed for potential legal violations. Major infrastructure partners like Bridge Data Centres, backed by Bain Capital, have terminated their ties with Megaspeed. That Megaspeed reportedly ceased new orders amid these probes raises serious questions warranting an American response. These facts raise serious concerns about Chinese companies using opaque corporate structures to circumvent U.S. export controls.\n\nThis flow of advanced AI chips to China and China\u2019s access to restricted cloud computing capabilities risk enabling Beijing\u2019s development of autonomous weapon systems, advanced cyber-warfare capabilities, and more powerful surveillance tools \u2013 which could eventually pose significant challenges to U.S. capabilities. China\u2019s military could one day use these technologies against American servicemembers. Large-scale diversion also creates a gray market that penalizes law-abiding companies and devalues the intellectual property that sustains U.S. global economic leadership.\n\nAccordingly, I respectfully request that you provide the following information to my office in writing by November 24, 2026:\n\nAn update on the Department of Justice\u2019s continuation of the Department of Commerce investigation into Megaspeed;\n\nA detailed description of any Department of Commerce efforts to prevent Megaspeed, whose top executive is reportedly a Chinese intelligence asset, from purchasing Nvidia chips, such as by sending an \u201cIs Informed\u201d letter to Nvidia blocking certain semiconductor shipments to Megaspeed and potentially placing Megaspeed on the Entity List;\n\nA detailed accounting of:\n\nThe Department of Commerce and Department of State\u2019s efforts to coordinate a rigorous response with partners including Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia;\n\nThe Department of Commerce\u2019s efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow Chinese companies to access restricted U.S. technology, such as semiconductors and cloud computing, through Southeast Asia; and\n\nThe Department of Commerce\u2019s efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow subsidiaries of China-headquartered firms, including those on whom the United States has already imposed sanctions, to buy export-controlled AI chips in the United States.\n\nA detailed explanation of the Intelligence Community\u2019s analysis of Alice Huang\u2019s reported service as a Chinese intelligence asset and the broader threat Megaspeed poses to U.S. national security; and\n\nA detailed explanation of the Intelligence Community\u2019s sharing of such information, on Ms. Huang and Megaspeed, with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the White House.\n\nThank you for your attention.\n\n###", 1, "2026-11-12T13:34:39Z", "2026-11-12T13:35:21Z"]], "columns": ["url", "title", "date", "year", "month", "party", "chamber", "state", "member_name", "bioguide_id", "domain", "scraper", "source", "date_source", "text", "has_text", "collected_at", "updated_at"], "primary_keys": ["url"], "primary_key_values": ["https://www.bennet.senate.gov/2026/11/11/bennet-presses-trump-administration-on-failure-to-stop-megaspeeds-apparent-ai-tech-diversion-to-china/"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.8660471066832542, "source": "dwillis/congress-press", "source_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press", "license": "MIT", "license_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press/blob/main/LICENSE"}