{"database": "press", "table": "releases", "rows": [["https://www.lee.senate.gov/2026/6/lee-cotton-sound-alarm-on-chinese-thieves-in-american-labs", "Lee, Cotton Sound Alarm on Chinese Thieves in American Labs", "2026-06-23", "2026", "2026-06", "Republican", "Senate", "UT", "Mike Lee", "L000577", "www.lee.senate.gov", "mikelee", "https://www.lee.senate.gov/press-releases", "scraper", "WASHINGTON \u2013 U.S. Senators Mike Lee (R-UT) and Tom Cotton (R-AR) today sent a letter to alert Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Chris Wright of Chinese nationals\u2019 access to American National Labs, where they are infiltrating sensitive research facilities to steal American intellectual property and technology to benefit Communist China.\n\nIn January 2026, the Senators, along with nine of their colleagues, sent a letter to Secretary Wright urging him to address this issue. In March 2025, they introduced the Guarding American Technology from Exploitation (GATE) Act as a legislative solution. The bill is currently being blocked by Democrats on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee.\n\nIn part, the Senators wrote:\n\n\u201cWe write expressing serious concern regarding the Department of Energy\u2019s (DOE) continued practice of permitting foreign nationals from China to access facilities across the National Laboratory complex and work alongside American scientists. Recent DOE data underscores that this practice puts the nation\u2019s research enterprise at risk of foreign intelligence collection and technology transfers that will benefit our adversaries.\u201d\n\nThe letter reads as follows:\n\nDear Secretary Wright:\n\nWe write expressing serious concern regarding the Department of Energy\u2019s (DOE) continued practice of permitting foreign nationals from China to access facilities across the National Laboratory complex and work alongside American scientists. Recent DOE data underscores that this practice puts the nation\u2019s research enterprise at risk of foreign intelligence collection and technology transfers that will benefit our adversaries.\n\nAccording to DOE\u2019s own data, Chinese nationals continue to occupy substantial roles across a variety of access types, including short term visits (approximately 1,900 in FY 2025), long term research assignments (approximately 1,300 in FY 2025), and even formal employment (approximately 2,100 in FY 2025). The Department further reports in FY 2025, on-site user facilities at the National Labs were accessed physically and remotely more than 5,000 times by Chinese nationals. These facts reflect severe vulnerabilities at our nation\u2019s premier and most sensitive scientific environments.\n\nChina is our main competitor in research and development and the race for emerging tech, where it seeks to surpass the United States by stealing American intellectual property and technologies. This is widely known and well-documented, and yet for decades we continue to give Chinese national scientists access to our National Laboratories.\n\nThese numbers are not small, nor are they incidental. They represent a systemic exposure of our National Labs, including the American scientists who work there and topics they are working on, to an adversary determined to defeat the United States. Given that DOE has not substantially reduced this exposure, we respectfully request answers to the following:\n\n1. How does DOE's risk framework account for China's National Intelligence Law, which legally obligates every Chinese citizen\u2014including those working in our National Laboratories\u2014to cooperate with Chinese intelligence services upon demand, regardless of where they reside?\n\n2. Why does the Department permit Chinese nationals to work inside the National Labs, side by side with American scientists?\n\n3. Are Chinese nationals given access to controlled technologies, export controlled technologies, or any other sensitive research environments within the National Laboratories? If so, how many?\n\n4. What steps is DOE taking to reduce remote access by Chinese nationals, given the Department\u2019s own finding that thousands of users operate remotely with limited oversight?\n\n5. Does DOE intend to reduce or cap Chinese nationals\u2019 participation in unclassified research areas, and if not, why not?\n\n6. What counterintelligence assessments has DOE conducted regarding the concentration of Chinese nationals in specific labs, programs, or user facilities?\n\nThe Department\u2019s mission is to advance American scientific leadership, protect national security, and safeguard critical technologies. This mission can\u2019t be achieved when it\u2019s undermined by thousands of Chinese nationals infiltrating the National Labs each year. We look forward to your thoughts on these systemic vulnerabilities affecting our labs.\n\nRead exclusive coverage by the New York Post here.\n\nRead the full text of the letter here.\n\n###", 1, "2026-06-24T06:25:30Z", "2026-06-24T06:26:49Z"]], "columns": ["url", "title", "date", "year", "month", "party", "chamber", "state", "member_name", "bioguide_id", "domain", "scraper", "source", "date_source", "text", "has_text", "collected_at", "updated_at"], "primary_keys": ["url"], "primary_key_values": ["https://www.lee.senate.gov/2026/6/lee-cotton-sound-alarm-on-chinese-thieves-in-american-labs"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.6699110381305218, "source": "dwillis/congress-press", "source_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press", "license": "MIT", "license_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press/blob/main/LICENSE"}