{"database": "press", "table": "releases", "rows": [["https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/news/press-releases/federal-workforce-caucus-co-chairs-file-amicus-brief-defending-civil-service-protections-for-federal-workers", "Federal Workforce Caucus Co-Chairs File Amicus Brief Defending Civil Service Protections for Federal Workers", "2026-07-30", "2026", "2026-07", "Democrat", "Senate", "MD", "Chris Van Hollen", "V000128", "www.vanhollen.senate.gov", "vanhollen", "https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/news/press-releases", "scraper", "U.S. Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Congressman James R. Walkinshaw (D-Va.-11), and Congressman Steny Hoyer (D-Md.-05), co-chairs of the Federal Workforce Caucus, led 43 Members of Congress in filing an amicus brief in Jackler and Jaroch v. Department of Justice. The brief urges the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to reverse a Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) decision that would weaken longstanding civil-service protections for immigration judges and potentially jeopardize due-process rights across the federal workforce.\n\nThe filing comes after the Federal Circuit granted an en banc hearing in the case, following an earlier amicus brief led by Senators Van Hollen, Mark Warner (D-Va.), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Gary Peters (D-Mich.), Andy Kim (D-N.J.), and Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.).\n\nThe MSPB ruled that the Attorney General has constitutional authority under Article II to remove immigration judges at will, despite protections established by Congress through the Civil Service Reform Act. The brief argues that Congress has the constitutional authority to set protections for federal employees, including notice, an opportunity to respond, and the right to appeal adverse personnel actions.\n\nIf upheld, the decision could allow agencies to argue that other federal employees deemed \u201cinferior officers\u201d are not entitled to traditional civil-service protections. As the Members write in their brief, \u201cMillions of federal workers would become removable at will\u2014the civil service merit system would functionally cease to exist.\u201d The brief warns that the ruling could undermine the merit-based civil service, expose career public servants to arbitrary removal, and erode Congress\u2019s constitutional authority to govern the federal workforce.\n\nThe brief was joined by U.S. Senators Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Andy Kim (D-N.J.), Gary Peters (D-Mich.), and Mark Warner (D-Va.), as well as Representatives Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.-11), Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.-At Large), Lloyd Doggett (D-Texas-37), Frederica Wilson (D-Fla.-24), Dave Min (D-Calif.-47), Veronica Escobar (D-Texas-16), Norma Torres (D-Calif.-35), Ed Case (D-Hawaii-01), Sarah Elfreth (D-Md.-03), Mike Quigley (D-Ill.-05), Stephen Lynch (D-Mass.-08), Sean Casten (D-Ill.-06), Judy Chu (D-Calif.-28), Jennifer McClellan (D-Va.-04), Paul Tonko (D-N.Y.-20), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.-12), Don Beyer (D-Va.-08), Jamie Raskin (D-Md.-08), Robert Garcia (D-Calif.-42), Lateefah Simon (D-Calif.-12), Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-N.J.-12), Bobby Scott (D-Va.-03), April McClain Delaney (D-Md.-06), Hank Johnson (D-Ga.-04), Glenn Ivey (D-Md.-04), Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.-09), Mary Gay Scanlon (D-Pa.-05), Adriano Espaillat (D-N.Y.-13), Kweisi Mfume (D-Md.-07), Seth Moulton (D-Mass.-06), Steven Horsford (D-Nev.-04), Gwen Moore (D-Wis.-04), Maxine Waters (D-Calif.-43), Suhas Subramanyam (D-Va.-10), and Jahana Hayes (D-Conn.-05), Johnny Olszewski (D-Md.-02), and Emily Randall (D-Wash.-06).\n\nIn their brief, the Members argue that immigration judges are covered by the Civil Service Reform Act and that the President\u2019s Article II authority does not permit the executive branch to disregard Congress\u2019s statutory protections. They also note that the Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision in Trump v. Slaughter, concerning removal protections for principal officers, does not control this case involving immigration judges, who are at most inferior officers.\n\nThe brief further warns that the MSPB\u2019s reasoning has no clear limiting principle. If immigration judges can be stripped of civil-service safeguards because of the authority they exercise, countless other career federal employees could face similar challenges to their protections.\n\nFull text of the argument in the brief can be viewed here and below.\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nThe Merit Systems Protection Board\u2019s decision was incorrect. Article II does not permit the President to override Congress\u2019s constitutional power to pass laws governing the federal civil service. Upholding the final administrative decision would fundamentally alter the balance of power between the Executive and Legislative branches. Millions of federal workers would become removable at will\u2014the civil service merit system would functionally cease to exist.\n\n\u201cPatronage practice is not new to American politics. It has existed at the federal level at least since the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, although its popularization and legitimation primarily occurred later, in the Presidency of Andrew Jackson.\u201d Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976). The levels of corruption occurring during the apex of the spoils system in the late 1800s compelled Congress to enact legislative reforms laying the foundation of the civil service for over 140 years. During postreconstruction America, appointments in the federal executive government were not given based on merit: \u201c....federal employees came and went, depending upon party service and changing administrations rather than meritorious performance[.]\u201d United States Civ. Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973).\n\nThe pitfalls of the spoils system were countless. Corruption and fraud at the expense of the taxpayer were the norm. Officials would regularly take home more than two or three times their government salary in bribes and exactions. See William B. Wedgwood, CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 9-11 (1883). Indeed, \u201c[t]he avenues to bribery were open wide by these practices, and the lapse from a gratuity to a bribe was easy. Many shifted their fealty from the government they professed to serve to the merchants or brokers who paid them a larger compensation.\u201d Id. at 58 (abridged statement of Silas W. Burt, Naval Officer of the Port of New York before the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment, Feb. 11, 1882).\n\nInstances of this corruption resulted in significant financial losses to the federal government. See Carl Russel Fish, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND PATRONAGE 137-140 (1905) (discussing the various schemes and frauds resulting in significant losses of public funds). \u201cThese vast losses of revenue, this demoralization of the service, these great scandals, were rendered possible and easy by the methods of appointment. Each one attended sedulously to his partisan work, paid large political assessments cheerfully, and re-imbursed himself from plunder from the merchant or the government.\u201d Wedgwood, supra at 59.\n\nThe government simply did not function efficiently, and the federal employee was less qualified: \u201c[a] spoils system does not drive ability from the civil service. [\u2026] The really deleterious change that the spoils system does make is to throw open the doors of office to a very inferior class of men, and to lower the minimum of capacity required.\u201d Fish, supra at 135. Employees worked in \u201cfear of arbitrary changes\u2026[t]he same thing occurs every time there is a change of administration or Secretary\u2026[i]t is a continued system of terrorism and demoralization.\u201d Wedgwood, supra at 75 (abridged statement of Edward O. Graves, Senior Official at the Treasury Department before the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment).\n\nAn early legislative effort to curtail the spoils system was the Tenure of Office Act in 1867. The Act required Senate concurrence before the President could remove certain executive officials. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997). In the floor debate on the bill, Senator Charles Sumner articulated that the actions of President Andrew Johnson and his administration were the primary motivation for this legislation:\n\nAndrew Johnson, who came to supreme power by a bloody accident, has become the successor of Jefferson Davis in the spirit by which he is governed and in the mischief he is inflicting on his country\u2026. He is a usurper, who promising to be a Moses, has become a Pharoah.\n\nDo you ask for evidence? It is found in public acts which are beyond question. It is already written in the history of our country. And now in the maintenance of his usurpation he has employed the power of removal from office. Some, who would not become the partisans of his tyranny, he has, according to his own language, \u2018kicked out.\u2019\n\nOthers are left, but silenced by this menace\u2026. Wherever any vacancy occurs, whether in the loyal or the rebel States, it is filled by the partisans of his usurpation. Other vacancies are created to provide for these partisans. I need not add that just in proportion as we sanction such nominations or fail to arrest them, according to the measure of our power, we become parties to his usurpation.\n\nFish, supra at 194-95 (quoting Senator Charles Sumner in Congressional Globe, 39 Cong. 2 sess. 542) (ellipses in original). \u201cThe Tenure-of-Office Bill of 1867 marked the first definite success that the Senate had obtained in its contest with the president for the control of the patronage[.]\u201d Id. at 197. The Act was not without its faults, see e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926), and it was ultimately repealed in 1887. Raines, 521 U.S. at 826. But Congress continued to combat the patronage system.\n\nIn 1883, Congress passed the Pendleton Act, the precursor to the modern Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). During consideration of the bill, Edward Graves, an official at the Treasury Department, testified before the Committee on \u201cCivil Service and Retrenchment\u201d and articulated: \u201cclerks suspected of being Democrats were ruthlessly slaughtered. One of my best book-keepers was discharged on that ground, although he was appointed under the civil service rules. I have no doubt, from general information, that the same system prevails with like results in all departments of the Government.\u201d Wedgwood, supra at 7, 13 (emphasis in original). The Act created the Civil Service Commission which could investigate and adjudicate violations of civil service rules promulgated by the President. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 558.\n\nCongress once again made strides in the battle against patronage via the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1911. The Act \u201cprovided that \u2018no person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given in writing\u2026.\u2019\u201d Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 383 (1983) (quoting HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, History of the Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign Countries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 202-203 (1976)) (ellipses in original). The Act also codified the right of employees to disclose information to members of Congress. Id. at 383-84.\n\nBut patronage practice re-emerged in the early 1970s. The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities found the Nixon Administration imposed an elaborate, multi-layered scheme to maximally corrupt the federal government for partisan political purposes. See SEN. SEL. COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,93D CONG., 1ST SESS., FINAL REPORT (1974). One aspect of the Nixon Administration\u2019s scheme was to hire individuals into competitive service positions that were politically aligned with the President. Id. at 416. Another finding of the Committee was that evidence suggested the Administration diverted taxpayer-funded grants and contracts to groups and areas that were most politically helpful to the President\u2014and done so in a manner that could constitute a criminal conspiracy. Id. at 439-440. The Nixon Administration even went so far as to meddle with a proceeding before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); evidence presented to the Committee suggested administration officials convinced the Chair of the EEOC to not pursue an action against the University of Texas because it could harm Nixon politically. Id. at 410. The Committee recommended criminal prosecution where appropriate and identified a number of statutory reforms aimed at curtailing the ability of the executive branch to weaponize the government for political ends. Id. at 442-44.\n\nAs part of reversing this Nixon Administration corruption and implementing the Committee\u2019s reforms, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 transformed the \u201coutdated patchwork of statutes and rules built up over almost a century\u201d with respect to executive branch employees. S. Rep. No. 95-969 at 3 (1978); Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978). The CSRA stands today as the chief line of defense between an independent civil service and a return to the spoils system.\n\nCongress acted squarely within its constitutional authority when creating the position of Immigration Judge and placing it under the protection of the Civil Service Reform Act. This is the will of Congress\u2014that Immigration Judges are entitled to the protections of 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513. By removing Megan Jackler and Brandon Jaroch without those protections, the President acted against the will of Congress. That action is sustainable \u201conly by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.\u201d Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Article II does not allow the President such power.\n\nThese removals run counter to centuries of historical Congressional practice affirmed by the courts. For almost 50 years, the Board has judiciously and even-handedly applied the CSRA while leaving constitutional review to this Court. Until now.\n\nThe Board\u2019s decision must be reversed. Given the nature and consequences of this matter, amici request that this Court issue a decision on an expedited basis.\n\nARGUMENT\n\nI. The Removals of Jackler and Jaroch Are Against the Will of Congress and Not Justifiable Under Article II.\n\nThe position of Immigration Judge was created by Congress pursuant to its power to \u201cestablish a uniform rule of naturalization[.]\u201d U.S. CONST. ART. I, \u00a7 8., cl. 4; 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229a(a)(1). As employees defined under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7511, Immigration Judges are entitled to the procedural protections set forth in 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513. Appx012. The removals of Jackler and Jaroch without the protections of 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513 is therefore contrary to the will of Congress. The President\u2019s removal power under Article II cannot \u201cdisabl[e]\u201d Congress from enacting a reasonable restriction on the removal of employees whose duties mirror tremendous swaths of the civil service. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).\n\na. The Creation and Regulation of the Position of Immigration Judge Is Well Within the Constitutional Authority of Congress.\n\nThe Constitution vests Congress with the power to \u201cestablish a uniform rule of naturalization\u201d and to enact all laws that are \u201cnecessary and proper for carrying into execution\u201d that power. U.S. CONST. ART. I, \u00a7 8., cl. 4, 18. The naturalization power is understood as a power \u201cexclusively in congress[.]\u201d Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. 259, 269 (1817). \u201c[The Supreme Court] has repeatedly emphasized that \u2018over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over\u2019 the admission of aliens.\u201d Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). In Federalist No. 42, James Madison stated that \u201c[t]he dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our system.\u201d THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison). \u201cBy granting Congress the exclusive power to fashion rules of naturalization, the Constitution removes these dissimilarities.\u201d United States v. Vazquez-Ramirez, 163 F.4th 706, 715 (9th Cir. 2026). Additionally, \u201c[a]t the founding, the word \u2018naturalization\u2019 meant \u2018[t]he act of investing aliens with the privileges of native subjects.\u2019\u201d Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 46 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting 2 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 1293 (4th ed. 1773)).\n\n\u201c[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution\u2019s grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are \u2018convenient, or useful\u2019 or \u2018conducive\u2019 to the authority\u2019s \u2018beneficial exercise.\u2019\u201d United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133-134 (2010) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413, 418 (1819)). Indeed, \u201cCongress is permitted to determine for itself what is necessary and what is proper.\u201d Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 372 (1882). This is not a demanding standard: \u201c[i]n determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.\u201d Comstock,560 U.S. at 134 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004)).\n\nIn Ex Parte Curtis, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting government employees from contributing or soliciting money for political purposes. 106 U.S. at 372-74. The Court analogized to several other laws where Congress set restrictions on government employees, such as a law \u201cwhich makes it unlawful for certain officers of the Treasury Department to engage in the business of trade or commerce\u201d and a law \u201cwhich makes it an offence for a clerk in the same department to carry on trade or business in the funds or debts of the States or of the United States, or in any kind of public property[.]\u201d Id. at 372. Justifying the law at issue, the Court stated: \u201c[t]he evident purpose of Congress in all this class of enactments has been to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service.Clearly such a purpose is within the just scope of legislative power[.]\u201d Curtis, 106 U.S. at 373.\n\nCongress explicitly set forth the position and duties of Immigration Judges by statute. As defined, \u201c[t]he term \u2018immigration judge\u2019 means an attorney whom the Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive Office for Immigration Review, qualified to conduct specified classes of proceedings, including a hearing under section 1229a of this title.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(b)(4). Further, \u201c[a]n immigration judge shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe[.]\u201d Id. The central function of an Immigration Judge is to \u201cconduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229a(a)(1). These proceedings are \u201cthe sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229a(a)(3). This statutory scheme and Congress\u2019s decision to apply civil service adverse action procedures to Immigration Judges, is more than fairly \u201crationally related\u201d as a necessary and proper exercise of Congress\u2019s \u201cexclusive\u201d power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 134; Chirac, 15 U.S. at 269. It is further consistent with Congress\u2019s Constitutional legislative authority to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of immigration judges\u2019 official duties and \u201cto maintain proper discipline\u201d in the immigration court system. See Curtis, 106 U.S. at 373.\n\nb. Congress Protects Immigration Judges Via the Civil Service Reform Act.\n\nThe Civil Service Reform Act provides certain procedural protections for employees in the executive branch. See Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978); 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513. Specifically, an employee subjected to an adverse action is entitled to \u201cat least 30 days\u2019 advance written notice\u201d and \u201ca reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in writing\u201d as well as \u201ca written decision and the specific reasons therefor[e] at the earliest practicable date.\u201d 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513(b). If the action is sustained, the employee may appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513(d).\n\nJackler and Jaroch are employees within the meaning of the CSRA. See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7511; Appx012 (\u201cthe agency asserts that the appellants met the definition of \u2018employee\u2019 under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7511 and thus were entitled to appeal certain adverse actions to the Board\u201d). Accordingly, Congress has provided that adverse action may be taken against them \u201conly for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service\u201d and in accordance with the procedures providing for notice and an opportunity to be heard. 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513(a).\n\nc. The Exercise of Article II Power in Removing Jackler and Jaroch Cannot Displace the Will of Congress.\n\n\u201cWhen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.\u201d Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). \u201cCourts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.\u201d Id. at 637-38. The President is in \u201cthe least favorable of possible constitutional postures\u201d under these circumstances. Id. at 640.\n\nThe Board\u2019s decision styles this case as one controlled by Article II of the Constitution, holding that \u201cArticle II abrogates the removal protections 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513 otherwise provide[d] to employees covered under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7511[.]\u201d Appx011. That ignores the work and power of Congress.\n\nIndeed, Congress \u201cdetermine[d] for itself\u201d that Immigration Judges, along with the rest of the positions falling under \u00a7 7511, are entitled to the procedural protections of the CSRA. Curtis, 106 U.S. at 372. Doing so is necessary and proper to ensure a uniform rule of naturalization untainted by political pressure or fear of reprisal, as well as a civil service built on \u201cefficiency and integrity[.]\u201d Id. at 373; 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301(b)(8)(A) (\u201cEmployees should be\u2014protected against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes\u201d).\n\nThis is the will of Congress. Removing Jackler and Jaroch is contrary to the will of Congress because they were not afforded the procedural guarantees of 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513. The only way to sustain this action is to hold that the \u201cexclusive presidential control\u201d over the position of Immigration Judge \u201cdisabl[es]\u201d Congress from acting. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38. In other words, the removal power would disable Congress from enacting laws necessary and proper to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, an area of \u201cexclusive[]\u201d Congressional control. Chirac, 15 U.S. at 269. Under such an interpretation, Congress becomes subordinate to the President\u2019s whims if it wishes to exercise its constitutional power. This result contradicts the text of the constitution and unduly cedes Congressional power to the President.\n\nMoreover, this is not a case where Congress seeks to reserve the removal power for itself, a fact pattern the Supreme Court has viewed with intense skepticism. In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court struck down a removal scheme providing that the Comptroller General was removable only by impeachment or joint resolution of Congress. 478 U.S. 714, 728-32 (1986). In short, \u201cCongress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment.\u201d Id. at 726. Two years later, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court distinguished the scheme in Bowsher to a Special Counsel removable only for \u201cgood cause\u201d by the Attorney General. 487 U.S. 654, 695-697 (1988). The Court upheld this removal provision because \u201cthis case simply does not pose a \u2018dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions.\u2019\u201d Id. at 694 (quoting Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727) (bracket in original).\n\nCongress, in the CSRA or Immigration and Nationality Act, does not \u201creserve for itself\u201d the power to remove employees of the Executive Branch. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726. The opposite is true. The CSRA created the Merit Systems Protection Board, an \u201cindependent body\u201d designed to \u201cadjudicate cases of alleged violation of the merit system, enforce compliance with its decisions and orders, order stays of personnel actions in cases where it determines that such relief is justified, and conduct studies of the civil service and other merit systems.\u201d S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 6 (1978). Congress has no role in the functions of the Board other than Senate confirmation of members of the Board. Id.\n\nCongress was acutely aware of the perception that it was too difficult to fire employees under the prior Civil Service System: \u201cMany managers and personnel officers complain that the existing procedures intended to assure merit and protect employees from arbitrary management actions have too often become the refuge of the incompetent employee.\u201d S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 3. And \u201c[o]ne of the central tasks of the civil service reform bill is simple to express but difficult to achieve: Allow civil servants to be able to be hired and fired more easily, but for the right reasons.\u201d S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 4. Indeed, the structure and requirements of the CSRA are so engrained across OPM and federal agencies that upsetting that framework would have a cascading effect across the entire government.\n\nCongress had no designs to hinder the Executive Branch in the performance of its duties. If the performance of Jackler and Jaroch was unsatisfactory or if they had engaged in misconduct, there is no outright prohibition on their removal. Congress only requires that the employee be given a chance to defend themselves before action is taken. See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7513. Delaying the ultimate removal of an employee for a short time to ensure they have received due process is a more than tolerable guardrail on the President\u2019s obligation to \u201ctake care that the laws be faithfully executed.\u201d U.S. CONST. ART. II, \u00a7 3.\n\nd. The Constitutional Basis for Congress Setting Removal Restrictions Is Even Stronger Here Than Other Cases Where Restrictions Have Been Upheld.\n\nThe Supreme Court has upheld removal restrictions in cases where Congress acts upon far weaker footing than it does here. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660; United States v. Arthrex, 594 U.S. 1, 23-26 (2021). If those restrictions are permissible, then Congress can certainly employ the CSRA\u2019s restrictions to a position created pursuant to a power that is \u201cexclusive[]\u201d and \u201ccomplete[.]\u201d Chirac, 15 U.S. at 269; Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 339).\n\nThe necessary and proper clause allows Congress to enact laws that are \u201cessential to the beneficial exercise of the [enumerated] power, but not indispensably necessary to its existence.\u201d McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 417; see also Comstock, 560 U.S. at 146. For instance, Congress executes \u201cthe power \u201cto establish post offices and post roads\u2019\u2026by the single act of making the establishment,\u201d but this also gives Congress \u201cthe power and duty of carrying the mail along the post road, from one post office to another. And, from this implied power, has again been inferred the right to punish those who steal letters from the post office, or rob the mail.\u201d McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 417. But the more degrees of separation a particular law is from the enumerated power, the more it becomes attenuated and subject to being struck down as an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power. See Comstock, 560 U.S. at 146 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)) (\u201cInvoking the cautionary instruction that we may not \u2018pile inference upon inference\u2019 in order to sustain congressional action under Article I\u201d).\n\nThere is an exceptionally close connection between creating the position of Immigration Judge and Congress\u2019s power under the Naturalization Clause. The text reads that Congress has the power to \u201cestablish a uniform rule of naturalization[.]\u201d U.S. CONST. ART. I, \u00a7 8., cl. 4. Creating the position of a Judge obligated to make rulings and decisions concerning naturalization is \u201cindispensably necessary\u201d to \u201cestablish a uniform rule of naturalization[.]\u201d McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 417; U.S. CONST. ART. I, \u00a7 8., cl. 4. And setting the removal conditions for that position is undoubtedly \u201cessential to the beneficial exercise\u201d if not \u201cindispensably necessary\u201d to effectuating that power. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 417. This connection is far less attenuated than other removal cases with Congressional action based in more general grants of authority, such as the Commerce Clause, yet where the Supreme Court has still upheld removal protections. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, \u00a7 8., cl. 7; e.g.,Comstock, 560 U.S. at 147-148 (\u201cCongress relies on different enumerated powers (often, but not exclusively, its Commerce Clause power) to enact its various federal criminal statutes\u201d).\n\nFor example, Morrison v. Olson involved an Independent Counsel appointed under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and given the power \u201cto investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high ranking Government officials for violations of federal criminal laws.\u201d 487 U.S. at 660. The Court held that removal of the Counsel for only \u201cgood cause\u201d by the Attorney General was constitutional. Id. at 695-697. The McCulloch-style inferences required to justify this scheme are numerous: the substantive criminal laws at issue would first likely have to pass muster under a Commerce Clause analysis, that the conduct at issue \u201csubstantially affect[s]\u201d interstate commerce. See e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). Then, from this, Congress has the power to employ people to prosecute these crimes, then the power create a position to specifically prosecute high ranking government officials, and finally, to determine how the Counsel can be removed as a way to further the Counsel\u2019s independence and efficiency. In short, the logic to justify the special prosecutor under the constitutional authority of Congress requires several inferences of the implied power of Congress. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 417.\n\nSimilarly, in United States v. Arthrex, the Court allowed CSRA removal protections to stand for Administrative Patent Judges provided that their decisions would be reviewed by the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office. 594 U.S. at 17, 23-26. Similar to Morrison, this scheme requires several analytical leaps to get to the Congressional root: the sale of goods and products affects commerce; patents are necessary to protect people that make those goods and products; some office must issue patents; someone in that office must determine the merits of a patent; and for-cause removal ensures the officials that review patents can do their jobs independently.\n\nIn stark contrast, an Immigration Judge, as a neutral, unbiased arbiter of Immigration Laws, is \u201cindispensably necessary\u201d to \u201cestablishing a uniform rule of naturalization[.]\u201d McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 417; U.S. CONST. ART. I, \u00a7 8., cl. 4. Congress would not get far in effecting a uniform law without judges who apply that law. Where the Court has upheld removal protections when Congress has legislated by \u201cinference upon inference\u201d limits of its constitutional power, then removal protections are certainly permissible when Congress legislates directly pursuant to a \u201ccomplete\u201d and \u201cexclusive[]\u201d power. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 146 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549); Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 339); Chirac, 15 U.S. at 269.\n\nII. Congress Has Consistently Legislated Protections for the Federal Workforce.\n\nOutside of the Article II removal context, Congress has set, and the Supreme Court has affirmed, a variety of safeguards for federal employees. The Fair Labor Standards Act sets forth a minimum wage that certain employees must be paid. See generally 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201, et. seq. In United States v. Darby, the Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor and Standards Act as a proper exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 312 U.S. 100, 122-126 (1941). The act applies to the United States government as an employer and is a congressional restriction upon how the executive branch may pay certain employees. 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 203(d), (x).\n\nThe Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulates the ways in which the federal government may treat its employees; specifically, the government may not take personnel actions against its employees or applicants on the basis of \u201crace, color, religion, sex, or national origin.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e16. In Brown v. GSA, the Court stated: \u201c[a]lthough federal employment discrimination clearly violated both the Constitution, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and statutory law, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7151, before passage of the 1972 Act, the effective availability of either administrative or judicial relief was far from sure.\u201d 425 U.S. 820, 825 (1976) (citations in original) (discussing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972). The Court\u2019s holding dealt with the exclusivity of the remedies under the Civil Rights Act, but the point remains: Congress may, and has, provided protection for the federal workforce against discrimination.\n\nSimilarly, the Whistleblower Protection Act makes it unlawful for the government to take certain personnel actions against employees that have disclosed violations of law. See generally 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 2302. The Court has acknowledged these protections for public servants, enacted by Congress, stating: \u201cthe government may certainly choose to give additional protections to its employees beyond what is mandated by the First Amendment, out of respect for the values underlying the First Amendment, values central to our social order as well as our legal system. See, e. g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.\u201d Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (citation in original).\n\nThe Hatch Act broadly prohibits certain federal employees from engaging in partisan political activity both on and off duty. See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 7323-7326. The Supreme Court upheld these restrictions on federal employees against a constitutional challenge in United States Civ. Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). The Court succinctly stated: \u201cOur judgment is that neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees.\u201d Id. at 556.\n\nThough these cases have not squarely encountered the intersection between Article II removal authority and the CSRA, or its predecessor, the message is clear: Congress setting protections and guardrails for the federal workforce at-large has been a consistent practice since the founding, the very same principle undergirding the decision in Ex Parte Curtis. 106 U.S. at 373 (noting the Congressional purpose to \u201cpromote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service\u201d). Upholding the Board\u2019s decision opens the door for a return to the spoils system and the catastrophic consequences of inefficiency, patronage, and corruption.\n\nIII. The Position of Immigration Judge Does Not Hold Unique Authority Such That Removal Is Obligated by Article II.\n\nIn permitting the removals, the Board reasons that Immigration Judges exercise \u201csignificant policymaking and administrative authority.\u201d Appx015. These duties include receiving evidence, issuing subpoenas, conducting hearings, exercising adjudicative authorities, issuing sanctions, and potentially\u2014if the Attorney General does not disagree\u2014making a final decision of the United States. Appx015-16. These are simply not unique functions.\n\nThroughout the federal workforce, countless other positions share the same or similar duties as Immigration Judges. The 1895 \u2013 Customs and Border Protection job series includes duties such as \u201cmak[ing] informed decisions regarding the admissibility of aliens into the United States and admitting, holding, or releasing merchandise\u201d and \u201cexercis[ing] sound judgment necessary to apprehend, detain, or arrest persons at the point of entry who are violating Federal immigration, customs, agriculture, or other laws.\u201d Positions in the 0967 \u2013 Passport and Visa Examining Series are responsible for \u201cmanaging, supervising, or performing administrative work concerned with adjudicating applications for United States passports or visas, including related work involving determining citizenship or fitness of non-citizens for admission to the United States.\u201d The 1980 \u2013 Agricultural Commodity Grading Series is responsible for \u201cexamining and evaluating agricultural products to determine their official U.S. grade and/or their acceptability in terms of quality or condition in accordance with official standards and related regulations.\u201d\n\nThese are only a few of the many job series that would be swept into the realm of at-will removal and outside of the CSRA if the Board\u2019s decision stands. The danger of a broad impact on swathes of the federal workforce is real\u2014the dividing line on what constitutes an inferior officer is increasingly blurred. See, e.g., Arthrex, 594 US at 55-57 (Thomas, J., dissent). The potential consequence here is that the CSRA is functionally eliminated and federal employees will no longer have protections against arbitrary removal, reprisal, or the assurance of due process.\n\nIV. Trump v. Slaughter Is Not Controlling Because This Case Does Not Concern Principal Officers.\n\nOn June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court decided Trump v. Slaughter, overturning Humphrey\u2019s Executor and holding the for-cause removal restrictions for members of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are unconstitutional. No. 25-332, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2877, 609 U.S. ___ (2026). The decision concerns only principal officers under Article II of the Constitution and therefore is not controlling in this matter because\u2014as Petitioners relay in their opening brief\u2014Immigration Judges are, at most, inferior officers. In the majority opinion, while discussing Justice Story\u2019s analysis of the Decision of 1789, the Chief Justice writes: \u201cHe [Justice Story] identified the very \u2018question\u2019 at issue in this case: \u201c[W]hether congress can give any duration of office in such cases [of principal officers], not subject to the exercise of this [Presidential] power of removal?\u201d 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2877, at 47 n. 6 (quoting 3 Story \u00a71531, at 389) (brackets in original). In fact, the majority opinion never uses theterm inferior officers. Justice Sotomayor notes in dissent (without rebuttal in the majority opinion) that \u201cthe majority studiously ignores\u201d the issue of \u201cinferior officers and civil-service employees.\u201d Id. at *125(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).\n\nJustice Gorsuch in his concurrence also notes this distinction, observing that \u201cthe civil service laws [\u2026] ordinarily afford rank-and-file agency employees considerable protection against removal.\u201d Id. at *65(Gorsuch, J., concurring). Accordingly, as Slaughter\u2019s holding did not extend to inferior officers or civil service employees, it does not control the instant matter\u2014especially in the face of clear contrary authority such as United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), Morrison and Arthrex.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nThat the President now asserts this authority under Article II does not change the fact that the removals of Jackler and Jaroch are in violation of the CSRA, and accordingly against the will of Congress. \u201cNeither the President\u2019s view that he can remove federal executive officials, see [Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)], nor his having done so, change the meaning of the statute or the binding nature of this Court\u2019s interpretation of it.\u201d Margolin v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Immigr. Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285, 1289 (May 26, 2026) (Thomas, J., concurring).\n\nAccordingly, amici respectfully ask this Court to reverse the Board\u2019s decision and to issue that decision on an expedited basis.", 1, "2026-08-05T07:37:37Z", "2026-08-05T07:38:44Z"]], "columns": ["url", "title", "date", "year", "month", "party", "chamber", "state", "member_name", "bioguide_id", "domain", "scraper", "source", "date_source", "text", "has_text", "collected_at", "updated_at"], "primary_keys": ["url"], "primary_key_values": ["https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/news/press-releases/federal-workforce-caucus-co-chairs-file-amicus-brief-defending-civil-service-protections-for-federal-workers"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 7.3411480989307165, "source": "dwillis/congress-press", "source_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press", "license": "MIT", "license_url": "https://github.com/dwillis/congress-press/blob/main/LICENSE"}