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releases: https://kelly.house.gov/media/press-releases/task-force-interim-staff-report-chronicles-stunning-security-failures-and-key

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Data license: MIT · Data source: dwillis/congress-press

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url title date year month party chamber state member_name bioguide_id domain scraper source date_source text has_text collected_at updated_at
https://kelly.house.gov/media/press-releases/task-force-interim-staff-report-chronicles-stunning-security-failures-and-key Task Force Interim Staff Report Chronicles Stunning Security Failures and Key New Findings in Investigation of Trump Assassination Attempt in Butler, Pa. 2024-10-21 2024 2024-10 Republican House PA Mike Kelly K000376 kelly.house.gov kelly https://kelly.house.gov/media/press-releases scraper WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Today, the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump released a bipartisan interim report entitled “Interim Staff Report: Investigating the Stunning Security Failures on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania.” The report contains preliminary findings and includes information obtained during the initial phase of the Task Force's investigation, which focused on the state and local law enforcement partners who assisted Secret Service at the rally. The preliminary findings in the report are based on 23 transcribed interviews with local law enforcement officials; thousands of pages of documents from local, state, and federal authorities; and testimony from the Task Force’s public hearing on September 26th. Notably, the report reveals new excerpts of testimony from Butler, Pa. local law enforcement produced during closed-door transcribed interviews with the Task Force. The report also provides a glimpse into the Secret Service’s inadequate preparation and communication with local law enforcement partners prior to and during the July 13 rally. The Report Contains Eight Key Findings: There was inadequate planning and coordination by the Secret Service with state and local law enforcement before and during the July 13 rally. The Secret Service did not place the AGR complex that the shooter fired from, and the surrounding area, inside of the secure perimeter. Local sniper teams positioned inside the AGR complex had a narrow field of vision and were not positioned to monitor the full AGR property. There was no unified command post to facilitate communications between the Secret Service and its state and local partners Critical pieces of information about Crooks and the escalating threat situation at the AGR complex moved slowly due to fragmented lines of communication and unclear chains of command on July 13. Testimony from local law enforcement indicates that they fired a shot at Crooks prior to the USSS sniper firing the kill shot. Crooks did not use a ladder to access the AGR roof. Instead, he climbed on the roof using an air conditioning unit. The autopsy report indicates a single bullet killed Crooks. “Put simply, the evidence obtained by the Task Force to date shows the tragic events of July 13 were preventable,” the report states. 1 2026-03-30T01:40:41Z 2026-04-07T21:57:20Z
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