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releases: https://www.bennet.senate.gov/2026/11/11/bennet-presses-trump-administration-on-failure-to-stop-megaspeeds-apparent-ai-tech-diversion-to-china/

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Data license: MIT · Data source: dwillis/congress-press

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url title date year month party chamber state member_name bioguide_id domain scraper source date_source text has_text collected_at updated_at
https://www.bennet.senate.gov/2026/11/11/bennet-presses-trump-administration-on-failure-to-stop-megaspeeds-apparent-ai-tech-diversion-to-china/ Bennet Presses Trump Administration on Failure to Stop Megaspeed’s Apparent AI Tech Diversion to China 2026-11-11 2026 2026-11 Democrat Senate CO Michael F. Bennet B001267 www.bennet.senate.gov bennet https://www.bennet.senate.gov/news/page/ scraper Washington, D.C. — Colorado U.S. Senator Michael Bennet, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, Attorney General Todd Blanche, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton demanding an update on the U.S. government’s investigation into Megaspeed, a Singapore-based firm that reportedly acts as a major conduit for transfers of restricted U.S. technology to China, including Nvidia’s advanced AI chips. The letter also requests U.S. engagement with Southeast Asian governments to address potential violations of U.S. export controls; punitive U.S. action against Megaspeed, such as putting the firm on the Entity List; and far stronger approaches to export controls and enforcement. Additionally, the letter requests an explanation of the Intelligence Community (IC)’s analysis of the threat Megaspeed poses, as well as an explanation of the IC’s sharing of that information with the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, and the White House. These efforts are crucial given reports that the IC concluded a Megaspeed executive was a Chinese intelligence asset with close ties to Nvidia’s CEO. “I request an update on the U.S. government’s investigation into the Singapore-based firm Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd. (“Megaspeed”) for potentially circumventing U.S. export controls and exploiting gray areas in the U.S. export control regime to divert advanced American semiconductor capabilities to China, including advanced Nvidia semiconductors. The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security initially led this investigation but New York Times reporting indicates that the Department of Justice is now leading this effort. Additionally, we request that you engage countries hosting Megaspeed infrastructure – such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia – to address potential violations of U.S. export controls. I also request your consideration of specific punitive measures against Megaspeed, as well as stronger approaches to export controls and enforcement,” Bennet wrote. “This flow of advanced AI chips to China and China’s access to restricted cloud computing capabilities risk enabling Beijing’s development of autonomous weapon systems, advanced cyber-warfare capabilities, and more powerful surveillance tools – which could eventually pose significant challenges to U.S. capabilities. China’s military could one day use these technologies against American servicemembers. Large-scale diversion also creates a gray market that penalizes law-abiding companies and devalues the intellectual property that sustains U.S. global economic leadership,” he continued. The letter concluded by requesting that Secretary Lutnick, Attorney General Blanche, Secretary Rubio, and Director Clayton provide the following information by November 24, 2026: An update on the Department of Justice’s continuation of the Department of Commerce investigation into Megaspeed; A detailed description of any Department of Commerce efforts to prevent Megaspeed, whose top executive is reportedly a Chinese intelligence asset, from purchasing Nvidia chips, such as by sending an “Is Informed” letter to Nvidia blocking certain semiconductor shipments to Megaspeed and potentially placing Megaspeed on the Entity List; A detailed accounting of: The Department of Commerce and Department of State’s efforts to coordinate a rigorous response with partners including Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia; The Department of Commerce’s efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow Chinese companies to access restricted U.S. technology, such as semiconductors and cloud computing, through Southeast Asia; and The Department of Commerce’s efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow subsidiaries of China-headquartered firms, including those on whom the United States has already sanctioned, to buy export-controlled AI chips in the United States. A detailed explanation of the IC’s analysis of Alice Huang’s reported service as a Chinese intelligence asset and the broader threat Megaspeed poses to U.S. national security. A detailed explanation of the IC’s sharing of such information, on Ms. Huang; and Megaspeed, with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the White House. Bennet has led efforts to ensure U.S. competitiveness and national security by preventing the transfer of advanced U.S. technologies to China. He helped pass legislation to bar American investments in certain advanced technologies with military uses, such as AI and semiconductors, in China and other countries of concern. He secured language in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence-passed Fiscal Year 2027 Intelligence Authorization Act requiring an intelligence assessment before the U.S. government approves AI technologies for export or signs an AI agreement with a foreign government. That assessment would evaluate the recipient country’s export control regime, its ties to adversaries like China and Russia, the risk of onward proliferation, and the likely end-uses of the technology. Bennet has blasted the Trump administration’s decision to allow the sale of Nvidia H200 AI chips to China and President Trump’s decision to pause U.S. export controls restricting the sale of critical technology to China. The text of the letter is available HERE and below. Secretary Lutnick, Attorney General Blanche, Secretary Rubio, and Director Clayton: I request an update on the U.S. government’s investigation into the Singapore-based firm Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd. (“Megaspeed”) for potentially circumventing U.S. export controls and exploiting gray areas in the U.S. export control regime to divert advanced American semiconductor capabilities to China, including advanced Nvidia semiconductors. The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) initially led this investigation, but New York Times reporting indicates that the Department of Justice is now leading this effort. Additionally, I request that you engage countries hosting Megaspeed infrastructure – such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia – to address potential violations of U.S. export controls. I also request your consideration of specific punitive measures against Megaspeed, as well as stronger approaches to export controls and enforcement. These efforts are crucial and time-sensitive given New York Times reporting that the U.S. intelligence community found Megaspeed executive Alice Huang to be a Chinese intelligence asset who passed critical information to the Chinese government. Ensuring the integrity of our export controls is central to advancing America’s national security and our long-term economic prosperity, including by preventing China – our only near-peer competitor – from obtaining advanced U.S. technologies with military applications, such as cutting-edge artificial intelligence (AI) chips. Our export control regime must be able to identify and curtail entities actively seeking to evade those controls. Extensive public reporting suggests that Megaspeed acts as a high-volume conduit for China-bound transfers of advanced American technology through the following activities: Intelligence Operations: According to The New York Times, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that a top executive at Megaspeed, Alice Huang (also known as Huang Le), acted as a Chinese intelligence asset to gather information for Beijing. Per this report, electronic surveillance revealed that Ms. Huang cultivated a close relationship with Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang. The report also indicated that Ms. Huang likely funneled information not only about Nvidia to the Chinese government, but also about President Trump’s plans and intentions. The report indicates that Megaspeed continues to trumpet its close connections to Nvidia. Exploitation of Sanctioned Intermediaries: Reports indicate that Megaspeed operated as a middle man, using Aivres – a U.S.-registered subsidiary of Chinese technology giant Inspur, on which the United States imposed sanctions for supporting China’s military – to source restricted hardware, such as advanced Nvidia AI chips. Aivres was able to purchase this hardware (1) because Aivres was not subject to the sanctions imposed on its parent company Inspur; (2) because the Department of Commerce has rolled back steps that restrict the subsidiaries of Chinese-headquartered firms from buying export-controlled AI chips from U.S. firms; and (3) because the Department of Commerce halted enforcement of licensing requirements for Chinese-headquartered subsidiaries in Malaysia from May 2025, creating more loopholes that have enabled the illicit diversion of sensitive U.S. technology. Aivres thus continued purchasing advanced Nvidia chips, which a Malaysia-based Megaspeed subsidiary then bought. BIS officials who visited Megaspeed’s Malaysia data center suspected that Megaspeed may have sent some of these chips to China. Meanwhile, Aivres currently advertises access to Nvidia’s most advanced and recently released Vera Rubin chips. Physical Smuggling and Diversion: Reports indicate that since 2023, Megaspeed’s Malaysian and Indonesian subsidiaries have purchased advanced Nvidia chips worth at least $4.6 billion, including the advanced Blackwell processors that the United States has not approved for export to China. A late 2024 BIS inspection of a Megaspeed site in Malaysia discovered advanced hardware in boxes rather than installed and in use, an unusual practice that BIS officials considered a potential indicator of diversion to China. Backdoor Remote Access: Reports indicate that Megaspeed operates AI data centers in Southeast Asia, potentially with Nvidia Blackwell processors, and may have used them to provide Chinese clients with remote cloud computing power from restricted U.S. hardware. As of October 29, 2026, Nvidia continued to list Megaspeed on its website as a cloud partner. This highlights another gap in current U.S. export control regulations, since the administration has not imposed restrictions to prevent companies headquartered in countries outside of China, like Megaspeed, from providing Chinese clients remote access to export-controlled chips. Opaque Ownership: Reports indicate that Megaspeed is a spin-off of 7ROAD, a Chinese firm with state-backed ties – raising concerns of corporate restructuring obscuring Beijing’s control in order to evade U.S. oversight. Recent probes underscore the severity of these allegations. The Singapore Police Force has investigated Megaspeed for potential legal violations. Major infrastructure partners like Bridge Data Centres, backed by Bain Capital, have terminated their ties with Megaspeed. That Megaspeed reportedly ceased new orders amid these probes raises serious questions warranting an American response. These facts raise serious concerns about Chinese companies using opaque corporate structures to circumvent U.S. export controls. This flow of advanced AI chips to China and China’s access to restricted cloud computing capabilities risk enabling Beijing’s development of autonomous weapon systems, advanced cyber-warfare capabilities, and more powerful surveillance tools – which could eventually pose significant challenges to U.S. capabilities. China’s military could one day use these technologies against American servicemembers. Large-scale diversion also creates a gray market that penalizes law-abiding companies and devalues the intellectual property that sustains U.S. global economic leadership. Accordingly, I respectfully request that you provide the following information to my office in writing by November 24, 2026: An update on the Department of Justice’s continuation of the Department of Commerce investigation into Megaspeed; A detailed description of any Department of Commerce efforts to prevent Megaspeed, whose top executive is reportedly a Chinese intelligence asset, from purchasing Nvidia chips, such as by sending an “Is Informed” letter to Nvidia blocking certain semiconductor shipments to Megaspeed and potentially placing Megaspeed on the Entity List; A detailed accounting of: The Department of Commerce and Department of State’s efforts to coordinate a rigorous response with partners including Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia; The Department of Commerce’s efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow Chinese companies to access restricted U.S. technology, such as semiconductors and cloud computing, through Southeast Asia; and The Department of Commerce’s efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow subsidiaries of China-headquartered firms, including those on whom the United States has already imposed sanctions, to buy export-controlled AI chips in the United States. A detailed explanation of the Intelligence Community’s analysis of Alice Huang’s reported service as a Chinese intelligence asset and the broader threat Megaspeed poses to U.S. national security; and A detailed explanation of the Intelligence Community’s sharing of such information, on Ms. Huang and Megaspeed, with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the White House. Thank you for your attention. ### 1 2026-11-12T13:34:39Z 2026-11-12T13:35:21Z
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