releases: https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/floor-statements?ContentRecord_id=5c569a84-9085-4bda-80c4-6279decbd217
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| https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/floor-statements?ContentRecord_id=5c569a84-9085-4bda-80c4-6279decbd217 | OPENING STATEMENT BY SASC CHAIRMAN JOHN McCAIN AT HEARING ON INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS | 2015-12-10 | 2015 | 2015-12 | Republican | House | AZ | John McCain | M000303 | www.mccain.senate.gov | legacy | Washington, D.C. U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, delivered the following opening statement today at a hearing on increasing the effectiveness of military operations: The Committee meets today to continue our series of hearings on defense reform. We have reviewed the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms on our defense acquisition, management, and personnel systems. And our past few hearings have considered what most view as the essence of Goldwater-Nichols: the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries and service chiefs, and the combatant commanders. This morning we seek to understand how Goldwater-Nichols has impacted the effectiveness of U.S. military operations and what reforms may be necessary. We are pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses who will offer insights from their many years of experience and distinguished service: General Norton Schwartz, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and President and CEO of Business Executives for National Security; Admiral James Stavridis, former commander of U.S. European Command and U.S. Southern Command, and currently the Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; and Dr. Christopher Lamb, Deputy Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. More than anything else, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the result of escalating concern in the Congress and in the country about the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. The Vietnam War, the failure of the hostage rescue mission in Iran, and the flawed invasion of Grenada all pointed to deep systemic problems in our defense enterprise that needed to be addressed for the sake of both our warfighters and our national security. In particular, Goldwater-Nichols focused on ensuring the unity of command and improving the ability of our forces to operate jointly. As we have explored in previous hearings, many questions remain about the balance our military is striking between core military competencies and joint experience. But as it relates to combat effectiveness, there is no doubt, as one former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs put it, No other nation can match our ability to combine forces on the battlefield and fight jointly. The subject of todays hearing relates directly to the many steps Goldwater-Nichols took to improve the unity of command. The law made unified commanders explicitly responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions and preparedness of their commands. It also removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command and prevented the services from moving forces in and out of regional commands without approval. Geographic combatant commanders were given the ability to issue authoritative direction on all aspects of operations, joint training, and logistics; internal chains of command; and personnel within their assigned areas of responsibility. These steps were effective in establishing clear lines of command authority and responsibilities that translated to a more effective fighting force than we had in the 1980s. However, thirty years later we have to take a hard look at this command structure, in light of current threats and how our model of warfighting has evolved. The United States confronts the most diverse and complex array of crises since the end of World War IIfrom rising competitors like China, revanchist powers like Russia, the growing asymmetric capabilities of nations ranging from Iran to North Korea, the persistence of radical Islamist extremism, and the emergence of new domains of warfare such as space and cyberspace. These threats cut across our regional operational structure, as embodied by geographic combatant commands. So we must ask whether the current combatant command structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic environment of the 21st century. Should we consider an alternative structures that are organized less around geography than trans-regional and functional missions? At the same time, as numerous witnesses have observed, while combatant commands were originally envisioned as the warfighting arm of the military and Department of Defense, that function has largely migrated to joint task forces, established on an ad hoc basis in response to emerging contingencies. This suggests that people have identified a shortcoming in the current design and have adopted measures to work around the system, as we see quite often. This should inform our efforts to re-evaluate and reimagine the combatant commands. At the same time, combatant commands have come to play very important peacetime diplomatic functions. Do these developments argue for changes in the structure of combatant commands? At a minimum, it would call into question the top-heavy and bloated staff structures that we see in the combatant commands. Time and time again during these hearings, we have heard how dramatic increases in civilian and military staffs have persisted even as resources available for warfighting functions are increasingly strained. As former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy pointed out earlier this week, combatant command staffs have grown to 38,000 people. That is nearly three divisions worth of staff in just the combatant commands alone. We have to ask if this is truly necessary, and whether it is improving our warfighting capabilities. At the same time, we have to examine whether there are duplicative functions in the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and subordinate commanders that can be streamlined. That includes the question of whether we really need all of the current combatant commands. For example, do we really need a NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM? Do we really need a separate AFRICOM headquartered in Germany when the vast majority of its forces reside within EUCOM? We also have to revisit the role of the Chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the Joint Staff and operational commanders at the expense of the services. Has that gone too far, or not far enough? Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates raised this issue when he testified before this Committee because of his frustration with the military services lack of responsiveness to current operational requirements. Many of our witnesses have discussed whether the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has sufficient statutory authority to perform the strategic integration that the Department of Defense all too often seems to do poorlyintegrating priorities, efforts, and resources across regions, across domains of military activity, and across time, balancing short-term and long-term requirements. The question has been raised whether the Chairman should be placed in the chain of command, with the service chiefs and combatant commanders reporting to him. We have heard testimony in favor and against, and I look forward to exploring this further today. These are critical questions about our defense organization that have direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. military operations, and as a consequence, on the wellbeing of our warfighters. We owe it to them to look at this seriously, ask the tough questions, challenge old assumptions, and embrace new solutions if and when as needed. I thank our witnesses again and look forward to their testimony. ### | 1 | 2026-03-30T12:14:52Z | 2026-03-30T12:14:52Z |